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Kar: What Can Bankruptcy Law Tell Us About Article III and Vice Versa?

WHAT CAN BANKRUPTCY LAW TELL US ABOUT
ARTICLE III AND VICE VERSA?
Robin Kar*

In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline
Co.,' the Supreme Court held that the bankruptcy code existing
in 1978 was unconstitutional because it violated Article III of
the United States Constitution. Article III states in relevant
part that "Itihe judicial power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."2 It then
sets forth the following requirements to help preserve the
independence of the tribunals that will exercise this power: "The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office." 3 Because the

bankruptcy judges under the pre-1978 system had rather broad
jurisdiction over the legal issues they could adjudicate, but
lacked Article III's protections, the Court held that the
bankruptcy system improperly delegated part of the judicial
4
power of the United States to non-Article III tribunals.
Since Northern Pipeline, the United States bankruptcy
system has undergone several major revisions, but this case
provoked and continues to provoke a veritable mountain of
commentary. 5 Most of the important issues raised by Northern
* Clerk to the Honorable Sonia Sotomayor, Second Circuit Court of Appeals; B.A.,
Harvard University, 1994; J.D., Yale University, 1997; M.A., University of Michigan,
1998. Thanks to Ian Ayres and G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. for helping to conceive the piece
and bring it to fruition.
1. 458 U.S. 50(1982).
2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
3. Id.
4. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 60-87.
5. See, e.g., Ralph E. Avery, Article III and Title 11: A ConstitutionalCollision, 12
BANKR. DEV. J. 397 (1996); John T. Cross, Congressional Power to Extend Federal
Jurisdiction to Disputes Outside Article III: A CriticalAnalysis from the Perspective of
Bankruptcy, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1188 (1993); Maryellen Fullerton, No Light at the End of
the Pipeline: Confusion Surrounds Legislative Courts, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 207 (1983);
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Pipeline, such as the proper scope of bankruptcy court
jurisdiction, 6 the proper scope of Article III, 7 and whether
Northern Pipelinewas itself decided correctly,8 have in fact been
discussed in sufficient detail that it would require a very good
reason to revisit this case. This article argues that such a
reason exists, both from the perspective of bankruptcy policy 9
and from the perspective of Article 111.10 It argues that Northern
Pipeline reflected a critical assumption that has remained in the
law to this day but is the undiagnosed source of several
persistent problems, not only in the bankruptcy context but also
in the Court's attempts to define the proper limits of federal
court jurisdiction.
The assumption in question is highly
intuitive and rather harmless on its face: it is that the source of
a legal right should play the central role in determining whether
its adjudication will require an exercise of judicial power under
Lawrence P. King, The Unmaking of a Bankruptcy Court: Aftermath of Northern
Pipeline v. Marathon, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 99 (1983); Kenneth T. Kristl, Note, Limits
on Legislative Court Judicial Power: The Need for Balancing Competing Interests:
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 59 CHI. KENT L. REV. 873
(1983); Louis W. Levit & Richard J. Mason, Where Do We Go From Here? Bankruptcy
Administration Post-Marathon, 87 COM. L.J. 353 (1982); Martin H. Redish, Legislative
Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J.
197; Jeffrey Gresham Tinkham, Comment, Northern Pipeline Construction Co. and
Raddatz: Clarification of the Article III Constraints on Article I Courts?, 21 HouS. L.
REV. 397 (1984); John T. Kennedy, Note, Northern Pipe Line Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipeline Co.: The Scope of Article I Court Jurisdiction:Abstract Principles or
PracticalConsiderations?,10 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 311 (1983).
6. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Marathon: It Is Time to Overrule
Northern Pipeline, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311 (1991); Vern Countryman, Scrambling to
Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Justice, the Judicial Conference, and the
Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1985); Philip J. Hendel & Joseph H.
Reinhardt, Attempting to Define the Scope of Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction:No Miracle
Drugs for the Patient, 92 COM. L.J. 350 (1987); Anthony Michael Sabino, Jury Trials,
Bankruptcy Judges, and Article III: The Constitutional Crisis of the Bankruptcy Court,
21 SETON HALL L. REv. 258 (1991).
7. See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Bush, Toward a Theory of Public Rights: Article III and the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 70 NEB. L. REV. 555
(1991); Mark V. Tushnet & Jennifer Jaff, Why the Debate Over Congress' Power to
Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts is Unending, 72 GEO. L.J. 1311 (1984);
Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning ofArticle III Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REV 581 (1985).
8.
See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 311 ("It is time for the Supreme Court
to recognize that Northern Pipeline was a mistake and to allow bankruptcy courts the
authority accorded them under the 1978 Act.").
9. For the purposes of this article, the "bankruptcy policy perspective" will be
defined as the perspective that is concerned primarily with utilitarian notions of
efficiency and fairness.
10. For the purposes of this article, the "Article III perspective" will be defined as
the perspective that is concerned primarily with protecting the independence of the
federal judiciary and thereby also protecting a certain class of counter-majoritarian
rights granted to individuals.
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Article III, and thus whether tribunals adjudicating that type of
right must meet Article III's other requirements concerning
judicial independence.
Because different rights warrant
differing amounts of protection from majoritarian processes, this
premise suggests that adjudication by an independent judiciary
is most important with regard to rights derived from sources
such as the Constitution, which are most removed from
majoritarian processes. Rights deriving from state private or
common law, from federal law, and finally, from broad
regulatory or administrative schemes would seem respectively
less and less likely to require exclusive Article III adjudication.
In what follows, the premise that leads to this view will be
referred to as the "sourcing premise."
A central goal of this article will be to expose some of the
problems with the sourcing premise and resolve them by offering
a view of rights that lends itself to a new approach to Article III.
This article argues that the sourcing premise is problematic
because it forces a choice between two clear evils: (1)
undermining the rationale and effectiveness of bankruptcy law
(in a manner that as shown below will also entail an
unwarranted set of restrictions on the administrative state more
generally), and (2) threatening the independence of the federal
judiciary. Replacement of the sourcing premise can, however,
alleviate the need to make this difficult choice. This article thus
develops an alternative approach to Article III, on the theory
that while rights function as trumps in our legal reasoning-by
excluding certain classes of countervailing considerations from
the processes of valid legal judgment, depending on the type of
right in question"--the classes of considerations trumped
should depend not only on the source of the right but on the
context in which it is asserted.
The context in which a right is asserted can be important in
one of two manners, which will be indicated in broad strokes
here and elaborated further in the main sections of the article.
First, the context can indicate something important about the
class of considerations that the right properly excludes.
Different classes are excluded depending on when a right is
asserted. Second, features from the context can provide a
sufficient reason for abrogating certain classes of rights.
Because of the way rights function, consent from the relevant
11. The most famous and authoritative articulation of this view can be found in
RONALD DwoRIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
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right-holder will also ordinarily rebut the presumption reflected
in a right, and the law can furnish formal procedures for
expressing the relevant types of consent. This article refers to
this view as the "context-based" view of rights and presents an
argument for adopting this view along with its associated
approach to Article III.
This article is split into three sections. Section I provides
the historical background to the relevant Article III and
bankruptcy doctrines, up through and then continuing past
Northern Pipeline. Section L.A discusses the bankruptcy code as
it existed before 1978. It then describes how inefficiencies in
this system made the system unviable from the perspective of
social policy, thus leading to its ultimate revision. The section
concludes by describing the new bankruptcy system that began
in 1978.
Section I.B examines the Court's 1984 holding in Northern
Pipeline that the bankruptcy code was unconstitutional under
Article III. Section I.C, finally, describes several more recent
developments in the law that should have bearing on Article III
and on the proper scope of bankruptcy court jurisdiction. After
describing Congress's reaction to Northern Pipeline and the
present bankruptcy code, this section discusses two major shifts
in the Court's Article III jurisprudence. In Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agricultural Products Corporation12 and Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,13 respectively, the Court
expanded the so-called "public rights" exception to Article III
and replaced the traditional formalist test for Article III validity
with a functionalist one.
Section II discusses the problems that these uncertain
Article III and bankruptcy law doctrines have created and
argues that a solution lies in a context-based approach to Article
III. Section II.A explores the arguments that the present,
revised bankruptcy code is unconstitutional, first under
Northern Pipeline and then under the Court's revised Article III
jurisprudence. The section then suggests that our present
bankruptcy scheme is unviable from the perspective of social
policy both because of its questionable constitutional pedigree
and because it attempts to meet Article III's requirements by
distinguishing between so-called "core" and "non-core"14 matters
12. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
13. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
14. For a description of this distinction in the language of this statute, see infra
notes 109-119 and accompanying text.
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in a way that invites an unjustifiable amount of inefficiency.
Section II.B, on the other hand, argues that any attempt to
resolve these bankruptcy-related problems from within our
existing approaches to Article III will seriously threaten the
independence of the federal judiciary. Finally, Section II.C
argues that this dilemma, which forces us to choose between an
Article III jurisprudence that threatens the independence of the
federal judiciary and one that undermines bankruptcy law and
the foundations of the administrative state more generally
derives from the fact that all of these approaches rely in one way
or another on the sourcing premise. After exposing this premise,
the section details an alternative, context-based approach to
Article III.
Section III applies this new approach to several different
areas of the law, beginning with bankruptcy in Section III.A.
Under this new approach, Northern Pipeline was decided
wrongly and bankruptcy courts should be given an expanded
jurisdiction over both "core" and "non-core" matters. One initial
advantage of this approach is that bankruptcy law could be
made more efficient and thus more viable from the perspective
of social policy. A second advantage is that this expansion
would in no way threaten the importance and independence of
the federal judiciary. Section III.B then applies this new Article
III approach to military courts, territorial courts and courts that
adjudicate "public rights," all of which have traditionally been
viewed as warranting exceptions to Article III. By showing that
a straightforward application of this new approach will yield
exceptions in just these three cases, this article ends by
suggesting that this approach offers us the elusive "unified
approach to Article III" that has so often been sought by the
courts.
Before proceeding, it is important to recognize, however,
that the sourcing premise is no mere mistake or oversight. The
premise finds its justification in a very powerful conception of
rights and of the role that rights should play in the law and in
the processes of valid legal reasoning. Under this view, rights
with different origins should exclude different classes of
considerations in our legal reasoning because different
procedures of lawmaking respond to different normative aims in
a constitutional democracy. Rights that originate in ordinary
legislation are, for example, the product of deliberations by
officials who are directly accountable to an electorate. Because
ordinary legislation is passed by this sort of institution, it should
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1999
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approximate the decision that most citizens would endorse.
Familiar complications aside, 15 ordinarily legislation is thus
well-suited to measure the intricacies of majoritarian impulses.
Because the United States legal system also contains a welldeveloped conception of the rule of law, along with a deeply
embedded inclination to treat like cases alike, rights that derive
from ordinary legislation will, however, reflect broadly
majoritarian concerns while sometimes departing from these
concerns in the particular case.
This seemingly paradoxical structure is well-suited to
reflect what is commonly called a "rule-utilitarian" conception of
value. Whereas all forms of utilitarianism define the "good" as
that which would generate the most happiness calculated across
all relevant persons, and the "right" as that which would
maximize this "good," 16 rule-utilitarianism is special in
recommending the adoption of those rules, rather than
particularized acts, that will maximize welfare, even if some
applications of the rules fail to meet this criterion. 17 Ruleutilitarianism thus best characterizes this first set of rights,
which derive from rules with general application that are aimed
at producing the highest satisfaction in the most citizens. If
ordinary legislative processes produce rules that reflect this sort
of aim, then the rights that derive from these legislative
pronouncements would seem to require little insulation from
majoritarian political processes.
A second class of rights is, by contrast, normally pictured as
essentially counter-majoritarian. Rather than expressing the
decision that would maximize the good of the whole, they
express restrictions on that very type of calculation, restrictions
structured to take account of the location of a decision's costs
and benefits in persons and to place minimal constraints on how
these allocations can be made with respect to each individual.
These rights, which are "deontological" or "agent-centered"

15.
Familiar complications include phenomena like low voter turn-out, the freerider problem and the high incidence of special interest group lobbying. Defenders of
this conception of ordinary legislation will, however, point out that accountability to an
electorate should at least keep a check on these sorts of excesses. See, e.g., ALEXANDER
M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF

POLITICS 17-23 (1962) (discussing how electoral accountability keeps democratic political
processes in line with roughly majoritarian sentiment).
16. For a good discussion of the structure of utilitarian thought, see JOHN RAWLs,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 22-27 (1971).
17. See, e.g., RICHARD B. BRANDT, MORALITY, UTILITARIANISM, AND RIGHTS 111
(1992).
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rights, derive primarily from two sources: first, from the
Constitution, which places constraints on majoritarian
legislation through the institution of judicial review,'18 and,
second, from the common law, which reflects many of the agentcentered features of common sense morality. 19 Because these
rights trump the majoritarian elements of our legal reasoning,
they require a tribunal insulated from ordinary political
processes for their adjudication. Consequently, these rights are
often viewed as falling squarely within the province of Article III
courts, and the presumption that the source of a legal right
should determine the institution that is right for its adjudication
has deep roots in political theory.
This article will therefore attempt to demonstrate that a
context-based view of rights also has ample, if less often cited,
support in political theory. A second but equally important goal
of this article will be to demonstrate how a better understanding
of political philosophy, and of how concepts such as "right"
actually operate in our ordinary moral practices, can help clarify
the law.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. The Pre-Northern Pipeline Era
Before 1978, bankruptcy law was administered by a hybrid
system consisting of Article III courts and more specialized
Article I courts, commonly known as "referees."20 Referees
performed many of the same functions as Article III courts: for
example, referees made factual determinations and adjudicated
21
legal claims in a whole host of bankruptcy-related situations.
As noted above, however, Article III requires that all members
18. Alexander Bickel is famous for arguing that judicial review is undemocratic
because of this counter-majoritarian aspect. See BICKEL, supra note 15. For some
classic responses to Bickel's "counter-majoritarian difficulty," see BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1
WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) (developing a "dualist" reading of the Constitution
as a response); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL

REVIEW (1980) (developing a "process-based" response to the counter-majoritarian
difficulty).
19. Elizabeth Anderson has commented on this aspect of our common sense
morality. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993) ("Another

set of intuitions deeply entrenched in commonsense practices concerns practical
principles known as agent-centered restrictions.").
20. See generally Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §§ 33-39, 30 Stat. 544, 555-56
(codified with amendments at 11 U.S.C. §§ 66, 67 (1976) (repealed 1978)).
21. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 39, 30 Stat. at 555-56.
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of the federal judiciary remain tenured and maintain protections
against salary diminution, 22 and referees had neither of these
guarantees.
Still, litigants could appeal adverse referee
decisions to district courts, 23 and district courts were given the
plenary power to withdraw any matter from referee
supervision. 24 This section describes the pre-1978 code and how
its inefficiencies ultimately led to an overhaul of the bankruptcy
code in 1978.
For the purposes of this article, the most significant feature
of the pre-1978 code was that it divided all bankruptcy actions
into "summary" and "plenary" matters and parceled out referee
jurisdiction on the basis of this distinction. 25 By the definitions
provided in the code, "summary" matters involved the
distribution of property in the actual or constructive possession
of the court 26-which was, in practice, limited to the distribution
of property actually held by the debtor, rather than by third
parties 27 -while "plenary" matters involved disputes relating to
the same facts but that arose with, or between, third person
28
parties with actual possession of the relevant property.
Although bankruptcy referees were granted automatic
jurisdiction over all summary matters, they could obtain
jurisdiction over plenary matters only with the consent of the
involved parties. 29 This system thus gave Article III courts
automatic jurisdiction over claims that arose in the bankruptcy
context but that were unrelated to disputes that could be
remedied by reorganizing the possessions of the primary
bankruptcy parties. Article I referees, on the other hand,
maintained automatic jurisdiction over the remaining summary
matters, even if the legal basis of the claims arose from
somewhere outside of the bankruptcy code. 30 Importantly, the
22. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
23. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541. § 38, 30 Stat. at 555.
24. Id.
25. For a good overview of this distinction, see 1 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 2D §§ 4: 1(E)-4:2 (1998).
26. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 2(7), 30 Stat. at 546, authorizes
bankruptcy referees to "cause the estates of bankrupts to be collected, reduced to money
and distributed, and determine controversies in relation thereto, except as herein
otherwise provided."
27. See Ralph Brubaker, Nondebtor Releases and Injunctions in Chapter 11:
Revisiting Jurisdictional Precepts and the Forgotten Calloway v. Benton Case, 72 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 1, 23-24 (1998).
28. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 2(6), 30 Stat. at 546.
29. Id. at § 38, 30 Stat. at 555.
30. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I 1.01[1][a][ii], 1-05[1][b][2] (15th ed. rev.
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constitutionality of the pre-1978 code was never successfully
challenged on the ground that it violated the appropriate
delegation of powers among the federal branches of
3
government. '
The summary/plenary distinction was important for the
development of modern bankruptcy law for the rather
paradoxical reason that it generated a host of inefficiencies that
made the pre-1978 system untenable from the perspective of
social policy. 32 As it turned out, clear cases of plenary claims
33
arose commonly in actual reorganizations and dissolutions,
and, because the status of a claim as plenary or summary could
sometimes depend on how the claim was framed, a large number
of claims either held an ambiguous status or could be made to
hold one through artful pleading. By withholding their consent
or by litigating the summary/plenary distinction itself,3 4 parties
with claims that lay in or near the plenary jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy courts could therefore attempt to shop forums on
many of their claims and engage in substantial tactical delay.
By splitting their claims into different forums, parties could also
increase the externalities of the overall proceedings and
diminish the overall resources to be split between the relevant
creditors. There are, however, by definition scarce resources in

1998).
31. See Alec P. Ostrow, Constitutionalityof Core Jurisdiction,68 AM. BANKR. L.J.
91, 104 (1994).
32. See LAWRENCE P. KING & MICHAEL L. COOK, CREDITORS' RIGHTS, DEBTORS'
PROTECTION AND BANKRUPTcY 691 (3d ed. 1997).
33. As one treatise has stated:
Under the jurisdictional structure created by the 1898 Act, there were many
disputes involving debtors and debtor estates that fell outside the jurisdiction
of the courts of bankruptcy, making it necessary for debtors and trustees to
initiate plenary lawsuits in non-bankruptcy federal or state courts. Such
plenary litigation, absent consent, was required in order to recover property of
the estate that was held under a more-than-colorable claim by a third party
having possession of it. Because of the limited scope of"summary" jurisdiction,
absent consent, even claims arising under provisions of the bankruptcy laws,
such as proceedings to recover fraudulently transferred property or to avoid
preferential transfers, were not assertable under the 1898 Act in a court of
bankruptcy, but had to be asserted in a state or federal court having
jurisdiction other than under the federal laws establishing bankruptcy
jurisdiction.
1 WiuiAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRupTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 2D § 4:2 (1998).
34. "This bifurcated jurisdictional system resulted in litigation concerning whether
a particular matter could be litigated in the bankruptcy court or if it required a plenary
forum." Johnathan L. Flaxer, Bankruptcy Court Power to Adjudicate Contract Disputes,
2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 369, 372-73 (1994).
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the bankruptcy context. 35 The system thus created incentives
for parties to bargain to keep a bad situation from getting even
worse, and gave unfair advantages to parties who were
especially wealthy or litigious and could increase their
bargaining positions at the creditor meetings by threatening to
litigate either the summary/plenary distinction or at least their
plenary claims in other forums. In sum, the pre-1978 code
created incentives to diminish rather than replenish, or properly
allocate, scarce resources, and did so in a context of relative
scarcity. The pre-1978 code also put certain types of creditors at
an unfair advantage at the creditor meetings. Overall, this
system thus made it difficult for bankruptcy proceedings to meet
the paradigmatic efficiency and fairness concerns that are
36
inherent in bankruptcy policy.
In response to these problems, Congress began a decadelong examination of the bankruptcy code in 1968, 37 which ended
with the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.38
Structurally, the Act made two main alterations to the
bankruptcy system. First, in an attempt to resolve some of the
efficiency problems mentioned above, 39 it eliminated the
plenary/summary distinction altogether and granted bankruptcy
40
courts broad, automatic jurisdiction over both sorts of claims.
In practice, this meant that bankruptcy courts had jurisdiction
over almost any proceeding that bore a substantial relation to
the facts in question in the reorganization or dissolution,
whether the source of the claim came from bankruptcy law or
35. See Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, 712 F.2d 55, 58 (3d Cir. 1983)
(referring to "[t]he economic fragility of the bankrupt's estate").
36. See Hon. Leif M. Clark & Douglas E. Deutsch, The Delaware Gap: Exposing
New Flaws in the Scheme of Bankruptcy Referrals, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 257, 292

n.137 (1997) (The 'summary/plenary' bifurcation of bankruptcy jurisdiction... was
viewed as a principle contributor to the inefficiency of the bankruptcy laws under the
[1898] Bankruptcy Act.")
37. See Hearings on S.J. Res. 100 Before the Subcomm. on Bankruptcy of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,90th Cong., 2d Seas., at 1 (1968).

38. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1978) (repealed 1984)).
39. "[Blecause of the manner in which bankruptcy jurisdiction was defined and
exercised, viz., the 'plenaryfsummary' dichotomy, the system was prevented from
operating efficiently. This was a major motivation behind the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978." 1 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRuc

LAW AND PRACTICE 2D § 1:4

(1998).
40. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S at 54 (stating that jurisdiction created by 1978
Reform Act is much broader than that exercised under former referee system, and that
the Act eliminated distinction between "summary/plenary" distinction by conferring
"related to" jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts).
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some other source, such as state or common law, and whether
the claim involved an unmediated creditor-debtor dispute or
depended on judgments concerning property in the possession of
third-person parties. 41 Second, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 transformed the highly interrelated referee-district court
system into a more divided one, which consisted of district
courts and more fully self-sufficient bankruptcy panels. 42 These
panels were set up as discrete adjuncts to the district courts in
each district and were given the power not only to hold jury
trials43 but also to issue final orders, 44 declarations, injunctions
and any other writs necessary to carry out their enumerated
bankruptcy tasks. 45 This second alteration was meant to help
unify bankruptcy proceedings into one basic forum and prevent
the related incentives to forum shop.46 Although litigants
maintained a right of appeal to the relevant district court in
these cases, all issues related to the factual disputes between
creditors and the party undergoing reorganization would be
decided in the first instance by an independent bankruptcy
panel, even if it meant deciding issues concerning third parties
and creditors and even if the source of the legal claim lay outside
47
of bankruptcy law.

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 worked about as well as
anyone could expect in terms of relieving bankruptcy cases of
the inefficiencies produced by the earlier code.48 The new
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. IV 1980) (providing that bankruptcy courts
"have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11
[the Bankruptcy title] or arising in or related to cases under title 11") (emphasis added).
42. See generally 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 2D § 3926 (1996).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Ricardo Cordeo, Annotation, Venue Provisions of National Bank Act (12
U.S.C.A. § 94) as Affected by Other Federal Venue Provisions and Doctrines, 111 N-L.R.
FED. 235, 280-81 (1993) ("Congress' clear intent in enacting the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 was to facilitate the convenient, expeditious, and centralized handling of
bankruptcy cases and related litigation. Section 241(a) of this Act... set forth the
provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1471, which granted a broad, unitary jurisdiction upon the
Bankruptcy Court, and the legislative history amply evidences Congress' belief in a need
for special venue rules in bankruptcy cases to complement this expanded jurisdiction
and to promote centralization of related litigation.") (citing In Re Dean Ford, Inc., 38
B.R. 4 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982)).
47. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 57
(1982).
48. See S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 49 (2d Sess. 1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5835; H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 340 (2d Sess. 1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6296-97 (noting the efficient "orderly" design of bankruptcy).
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bankruptcy judges, however, appeared to hold a more
problematic status with regard to Article III than their
predecessors. These new judges were much like Article III
judges in that they were appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate, 49 and had jurisdiction over
many paradigmatic non-bankruptcy claims,5 0 which would
ordinarily be considered Article III claims.
In terms of
constitutional guarantees, however, these new judges resembled
their non-Article III predecessors: they were limited to fourteenyear terms, 51 they were subject to removal for certain
enumerated causes including incompetence 52 and their salaries
were left wholly unprotected from congressional alteration.5 3 In
effect, the Act appeared to grant bankruptcy judges the power
and jurisdiction of an Article III court while leaving them
dependent on the legislative branch for their employment and
salary. By doing so, the Act created a bankruptcy system that
would appear ripe for constitutional criticism under the Court's
Article III jurisprudence.
B. The Northern Pipeline Challenge
In 1982, the Supreme Court entertained an Article III
challenge to the existing bankruptcy code in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co. 54 The case involved
the reorganization of a debtor who filed for Chapter 11 under
relatively unexceptional circumstances.5 5 Two months after
filing, the debtor tried to incorporate several new suits against
one of its creditors.5 6 From the bankruptcy perspective, these
suits were unorthodox because they involved third-party
counterclaims for breach of contract, breach of warranty,
misrepresentation, coercion, and duress,5 7 all of which arose
from state common law rather than from the federal bankruptcy
code.58
The case thus afforded the Court with a prime
49. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1978)) (repealed 1984).
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1978) (repealed 1984).
51. See id. at § 153(a).
52. See id. at § 153(b).
53. See id. at § 154.
54. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
55. See id. at 56.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58.

See id. at 84.
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opportunity to examine the constitutionality of the bankruptcy
This section examines Northern
courts' new jurisdiction.
Pipeline and describes the uncertain legacy it generated with
respect to Article III and the proper scope of bankruptcy court
jurisdiction.
As stated above, the central issue in Northern Pipeline
derived from the fact that the debtor was attempting to
incorporate state law claims into the bankruptcy proceedings.
All the parties agreed that by its letter, the 1978 code granted
bankruptcy courts expanded jurisdiction over these sorts of
claims, with or without the parties' consent.5 9 The creditor was
therefore forced to argue that this expansion violated
constitutional, rather than statutory, norms. 60 Taking this basic
tack, the creditor argued that by expanding bankruptcy
jurisdiction to include state law counterclaims, the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 effectively conferred a part of the "judicial
power of the United States"6 1 on judges who lacked both life
On the
tenure and protection against salary diminution.
creditor's account, this conferral thereby violated Article III of
the United States Constitution, 62 and the creditor moved to
dismiss these claims from the bankruptcy proceedings
altogether.
Although the bankruptcy court made short shrift of the
creditor's motion, 63 the higher federal courts quickly recognized
that there were important issues at stake. The district court in
fact reversed on the strength of the creditor's Article III claim.
In coming to its holding, the court cited fundamental
constitutional values as well as broad structural concerns for the
appropriate checks and balances and a proper distribution of
power among the federal branches of government. The Supreme
Court then indicated just how important the issue was by
granting certiorari to hear the case.6 At this stage, the United
States filed an amicus curiae brief and joined the debtor in
defending the 1978 code from this seemingly unprecedented
challenge. 65 The importance of this case to all the parties is

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
(1981).
65.

See id. at 84.
See id. at 52.
Id. at 62
See id. at 57.
See In re Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 6 B.R. 928 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 454 U.S. 1029
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, First English (No. 85-1199)
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best explained by noting that it presented a nexus where
fundamental ideological concerns came into conflict. Concerns
for the independence of the federal judiciary and for the rights of
creditors in situations where debtors are at or near insolvency
came head-to-head with concerns about the legitimacy of
granting the authority to adjudicate legal issues to non-Article
III tribunals and about the proper strength and scope of the
66
modern administrative state.
1. The Majority'sApproach
Ultimately, the majority issued an opinion that is famous
67
not only for affirming the unconstitutionality of the 1978 code
but also for instating a highly general and formalistic approach
to Article III's "judicial power" clause. 68 Under this approach,
whether a decision requires an exercise of judicial power should
be decided by applying a set of formal criteria to the decision in
question, and any such decision must, as a general rule, be
69
vested in a court system that meets Article III's requirements.
Although there are some exceptions to this rule, exceptions are
warranted only when generated by the Constitution or by
70
prolonged historical consensus.
Technically, the Court discussed the substance of this
approach in two separate sections. First, the Court discussed
the circumstances under which Congress can create legislative
courts pursuant to one of these alleged exceptions to Article
111.71 Second, the Court discussed the circumstances in which a
hybrid system of Article III courts and Article I adjuncts meets
Article III's requirements.7 2 It is important to note, however,
that these two inquiries are analytically indistinguishable: both
answer part of the question of when adjudications can be
performed in forums that are partly or completely independent
of Article III protection. The majority's opinion is thus best
viewed as an inquiry into the circumstances in which Article III
allows non-Article III courts to perform various adjudicatory
(capitalization altered).
66. See In re Northern Pipeline, 6 B.R. at 929-30.
67. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-60 (repealed
1984)).
68. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50.
69. See id. at 56-60.
70. See id. at 64, 70.
71. See id. at 63-76.
72. See id. at 76-87.
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functions.
In addressing the so-called "exceptions" to Article III-i.e.,
at the "first stage" of the analysis-the Court took a historical
approach and relied heavily on the fact that Congress has
always been able to create only three distinct types of legislative
courts: territorial courts, military courts and courts that
adjudicate "public rights." 3 Although the Court did not define
"public rights" in its opinion, it explained that at minimum these
74
rights must involve disputes where the government is a party.
The Court cited a sovereign immunity rationale for this
exception, explaining that because the federal government has
this immunity, but can consent to be sued, Congress should be
able to create legislative courts to adjudicate public rights
75
pursuant to its right to attach conditions to its consent.
After outlining these three exceptions, the Court noted that
bankruptcy courts are neither territorial courts nor military
courts 76 and then rejected the contention that they adjudicate
only public rights in the sense under discussion.7 7 The Court
reasoned that "the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations,
which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be
distinguished from the adjudication of state-created private
rights such as the right to recover contract damages .... The
former may well be a 'public right,' but the latter obviously is
not."78 On the basis of this reasoning, the Court rejected the
contention that bankruptcy courts of the post-1978 variety could
be created pursuant to Congress's exceptional power to create
79
Article I legislative courts.
Before proceeding to the second portion of the Court's
analysis, it is important to note that there are already several
problems with the Court's reasoning. First, the Court failed to
explain why these three exceptions are warranted in the first
place. Although the Court alludes to the notion that the
exceptions are warranted by history and the Constitution,8 0 the
constitutional-i.e., the Article III--question is exactly what was

73. Id. at 63-71.
74. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69-70
(1982) (citing Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)).
75. See id. at 67-68 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 26, 50 (1932)).
76. See id. at 71.
77. Id.

78.

See id.

79.
80.

See id.
See id. at 70.
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at issue in this case. Consequently, all that is left of the Court's
explanation is a cursory allusion to history. In its discussion of
history, however, the Court failed to account for why the
traditional exceptions to Article III were made in the precise
circumstances cited. In the absence of such an account, it is
unclear whether the rationale underlying these three exceptions
might not apply to bankruptcy courts as well.
Moreover, to the extent that the Court did indicate a
method of distinguishing between Article I and Article III
jurisdiction on a principled basis,8 ' it did so in a way that not
only seems untenable but that the Court itself failed to employ
consistently. As shown above, the Court failed to give a
rationale that might warrant the three exceptions it discussed in
a unifying manner. It did, however, spend some time discussing
the alleged rationale behind the public rights doctrine,8 2 and one
might therefore try to generate a more satisfying account by
elaborating on this rationale. If Article I adjudication were to
follow from the fact that the government's sovereign immunity
allows it to attach conditions to its consent to be sued,8 3 the
government would, however, be able to evade all constitutional
challenges brought in Article III forums. This result not only
seems counterintuitive in light of the central role that the
federal judiciary is normally thought to play in protecting the
Constitution, but it ignores the fact that our present law
expressly provides for vehicles through which citizens can sue
84
the state, even if sometimes in a fictionalized form.
Further problems come from other quarters. In discussing
the public rights doctrine, the Court suggested that while state
and common law claims are private rights, the restructuring of

81. See id. at 67-70.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 67.
84. In particular, the present law under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and
its progeny creates a series of legal fictions that allow aggrieved parties to sue the state
in an Article III court by suing a state official in her official capacity. This phenomenon
has been described quite aptly by one author as follows:
The doctrine of Ex parte Young... relies on legal fiction when suits are
brought against state officials to overcome this paradox. This legal fiction
allows a court to recognize an official's unconstitutional conduct as state action
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, while simultaneously concluding
that the action is "not attributable to the State for purposes of the Eleventh
[Amendment]." By adopting this legal fiction, the Young Court held that the
suit against the Attorney General was not against the State.
Nathan C. Thomas, Note, The Withering Doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 83 CORNELL L.
REv. 1068, 1078-79 (1998) (footnotes omitted) (brackets in original).
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creditor-debtor relations may be "public rights" by virtue of their
content alone.85 This suggestion would allow for a class of
"public rights" to exist even when the government is wholly
uninvolved in the proceedings, and would thus conflict with the
cited sovereign immunity rationale for this exception. Finally,
contrary to its particular conception of sovereign immunity, the
Court suggested that the rights at issue in Northern Pipeline
were private rights not because there was no governmental
86
party involved, but because the rights were "state-created." If
rights are considered private merely because they are created by
a state, however, the government would be forced to litigate its
disputes with citizens over all these rights in Article III
tribunals, with or without the government's consent. Again, this
conclusion would conflict with the Court's sovereign immunity
rationale for the public rights doctrine.
For all these reasons, the Court's holding is inconsistent
with the only rationale given for a division between Article I and
Article III jurisdiction. These facts should cast some doubt on
the proposition that bankruptcy jurisdiction of the 1978 variety
must be limited to "public rights" as defined by the Court.
In the latter half of its substantive discussion, the majority
discussed the possibility that Congress might control the
processes by which a right is adjudicated pursuant to its Article
I powers to create rights in general. The majority rejected the
broad view that Congress can wholly remove a concern from
87
Article III jurisdiction any time Congress can create a right.
The Court explained, quite rightly, that this broad view would
effectively eviscerate Article III's separation of powers and
88
impartiality concerns.
Nevertheless, the Court conceded that where Congress can
create a right, it should also have some greater measure of
control over the procedures used to adjudicate it.89 Granting
that in these sorts of cases Congress might distribute
jurisdiction in the first instance to a tribunal that lacks Article
III protections, so long as there is review by an Article III court,
the Court articulated a set of indicia that hybrid Article I/Article
III systems should meet in order to guarantee that the "essential
85.
(1982).
86.
87.
88.
89.

See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71
Id.
See id. at 80-81.
See id. at 80.
See id. at 83-84.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1999

17

432

MontanaMONTANA
Law Review, Vol.
60 [1999],
Iss. 2, Art. 4
LAW
REVIEW

Vol. 60

features of judicial power" still vest in the federal judiciary.9 0
These indicia include: the power of the Article III court to review
under a de novo, as opposed to a clearly erroneous, standard, its
ability to rehear evidence, its maintenance of appointment and
removal powers over the Article I officers, limitations on the
extent of the subject matter jurisdiction delegated to the Article
I tribunals, limitations on their jurisdiction to factual inquiries
and limitations preventing the Article I tribunals from presiding
over jury trials or issuing enforceable orders or sanctions. 91
Under this standard, the 1978 code had three main
problems. It allowed for review only under a clearly erroneous
standard, it delegated a large band of jurisdiction to bankruptcy
courts, and it allowed bankruptcy courts to exercise all of the
ordinary powers of district courts, such as the power to preside
92
over juries and issue enforceable orders and sanctions.
Because the 1978 bankruptcy system placed these "essential
attributes of judicial power" in non-Article III tribunals, the
93
Court held that the regime was unconstitutional.
In the end, the Court thus formulated a test that required
courts to look first at the source of a right in question. If the
right was derived from the United States Constitution or state
law, it was to be adjudicated by an Article III court in the first
instance. If the right was created by Congress, however, then
the test required courts to apply a general formula for
determining when the "essential attributes of the judicial power"
were maintained in an Article III court. Finally, regardless of
the source of the right, the Court made three exceptions to
Article III for military courts, territorial courts and courts
94
limited to adjudicating public rights.
By splitting its opinion into two sections, however, the
Court failed to see the internal inconsistencies in its approach to
Article III. For example, although Article III's language is broad
and appears to allow for no exceptions, and although the Court
refused to allow the many instances of administrative agencies
that had grown up since the New Deal to warrant exceptions to
Article III, 95 the Court still read "history," in the limited sense of
90.
(1982).
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84-86
See id. at 84-87.
See id. at 85.
Id. at 84-85.
Id. at 64-70.
See generally Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S.
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traditions in place at the nation's founding, to warrant three
exceptions. 96 The standard rationale for this sort of exception is
that once a historic practice has survived long enough, it should
be deemed to have been granted tacit acceptance by virtue of not
being overturned. 97 It is, however, difficult to see how this
rationale could be used to usefully distinguish between the
founding and much of our later historical practice. Moreover,
the formalistic test employed by the Court yielded the
counterintuitive result that even if a hybrid system were to
retain all the "essential attributes of Article III," it could be
deemed unconstitutional simply because the source of the right
was the Constitution or state law, rather than ordinary federal
legislation. The most telling failure lay, however, in the fact
that the Court failed to provide an account of Article III that
would simultaneously explain why the historical exceptions it
allowed were justified, why the source of a right is important for
the constitutional inquiry, and why the Court's formalistic
approach to Article III preserves the meaning and purpose of the
clause. The Court failed, in other words, to provide a unified
account of Article III.
2. The Approach in Justice White's Dissent
Justice White pointed out this failure in his dissent and
challenged the Court to articulate a more general, principled
framework for determining when non-Article III courts can
adjudicate Article III claims. 98 Noting that the practice of using
administrative courts had become widespread since the rise of
the New Deal, he suggested that the Court take a more case-bycase balancing approach to analyzing these sorts of

50, 52-89 (1982).
96. See id. at 70 n.25.
97. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) ("W]e must bear
in mind that considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory
construction, where Congress is free to change this Court's interpretation of its
legislation.") (White, J.).
98. Justice White wrote:
Instead of telling us what it is Art. I courts can and cannot do, the plurality
presents us with a list of Art. I courts.... Without a unifying principle, the
plurality's argument reduces to the proposition that because bankruptcy courts
are not sufficiently like any of these three exceptions, they may not be either
Art. I courts or adjuncts to Art. III courts. But we need to know why
bankruptcy courts cannot qualify as Art. I courts in their own right.
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 105 (1982) (White,
J., dissenting).
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arrangements. 99 Under Justice White's view, after looking to
the source of the right, if a court finds a seeming violation, the
court should determine how significantly the given arrangement
disturbs the purposes of Article III and whether Congress's
reasons for allocating power in that manner were strong enough
to outweigh these Article III values. 0 0
Although Justice White was willing to give Article III
concerns ample weight, he would have thus submitted them to
an essentially utilitarian calculus, and it is probably this fact
that kept some of the other judges from joining his dissent.
Still, in the ensuing years, Justice White's dissent became an
important voice for the efficiency and strength of the
administrative state. 1 1 In applying his alternative approach to
the case at hand, Justice White reasoned that in the bankruptcy
context, where particular claims are likely to be of low political
interest, appellate review should significantly alleviate any
Article III concerns about the constitutionality of more
expansive bankruptcy court jurisdiction. 0 2 Justice White would
103
therefore have upheld the 1978 scheme.
C. Recent Developments
After issuing its opinion in Northern Pipeline, the Court
stayed the decision until October 1982 in order to give Congress
some time to remove the jurisdictional problems exposed in the
existing bankruptcy code. 0 4 Congress failed to perform this
task in time, however, and although the Court issued a second
stay of its opinion until Christmas Eve, 1982, Congress once
again failed to remedy the situation in time. 0 5 Given the
growing crisis and backlog of bankruptcy cases, the Judicial
Conference of the United States generated an Emergency
Rule, 10 6 which was quickly adopted by each circuit, and which
reinstated a rough analogue of the pre-1978 bankruptcy

99. See id. at 113.
100. See id. at 113-16.
101. See Kate Stith, Byron R. White, Last of the New Deal Liberals, 103 YALE L.J. 19
(1993).
102. Northern Pipeline,458 U.S. at 116-118 (White, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 113-16.
104. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 38 (1995).
105. Id.
106. Emergency Rule, reprinted in 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY 3.01[2] [b] [ii] n. 15
at 3-9 to 3-12 (15th ed. rev. 1998).
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panels. 10 7 To ensure the constitutionality of this order, the
Judicial Conference built on the Northern Pipeline majority's
language concerning "the essential attributes of judicial
power";108 it also followed the majority in distinguishing between
"core" and "non-core" bankruptcy matters. 109 For better or
worse, this emergency rule eventually hardened in its essentials
into our present bankruptcy code, thus replacing Congress'
laborious ten-year project to renovate the bankruptcy system in
light of its many efficiency problems. 110 This section describes
the essential features of our present bankruptcy code and then
elaborates on several post-Northern Pipeline developments in
the Court's Article III jurisprudence that bear on the code's
constitutionality.
The most important alteration in bankruptcy law that
Congress made in response to Northern Pipeline was to instate
what is now known as the "core/non-core" distinction. Under the
present code, bankruptcy panels still retain broad jurisdiction
over (1) "all cases under title 11" and (2) "all civil proceedings
arising under title 11, or (3) arising in or related to cases under
title 11. "111 (The last class contains claims such as state law
counterclaims.) 112 These claims are also categorized as "core"
and "non-core" matters, with non-core matters encompassing
those matters that are only "related to" Title 11 and core
matters encompassing those that are under or arise under Title
107. See RICHARD I. AARON, BANKRUpTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 3.01[3]-[4] (1998).
108. See generally Emergency Rule, reprinted in 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
3.01[1][b][vi], at 3-17 (15th ed. 1991); see also Jeffrey T. Ferriell, Constitutionalityof the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109,
118 (1989).
109. See Ferriell, supra note 108, at 118.
110. See 130 CONG. REC. H6241 (daily ed. March 21, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier) ("The solution offered by my amendment has been at work in the last 18
months under the emergency bankruptcy rule... Congressional enactment of the
[emergency] rule is the purpose of my amendment, and that is all that is necessary.");
130 CONG. REC. H1847-H1848 (daily ed. March 21, 1984) (statement of Rep. Kindness);
130 CONG. REC. H1849 (daily ed. March 21, 1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier); 130
CONG. REC. H20224 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep. Rodino) ("The conferees
adopted most of the provisions creating this new Bankruptcy Court arrangement that
were contained in the bill passed by this body."); 129 CONG. REC. S9921-23 (daily ed.
April 27, 1983) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) (stating that Senate passed bill governing,
among other things, Bankruptcy Court jurisdiction patterned after Emergency Rule);
129 CONG. REC. S9923-24 (daily ed. April 27, 1983) (statement of Sen. Heflin) (same);
129 CONG. REC. S9937-39 (daily ed. April 27, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (same).
111. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1998) (emphasis added).
112. See Nanodata Computer Corp. v. Kollmorgen Corp. (In re Nanodata Computer
Corp.), 52 B.R. 334, 338-43 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that state law issues
normally merit "related to" jurisdiction as governed by § 157(c) of Title 11).
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With respect to non-core matters, bankruptcy judges are
114
limited to conducting hearings for proposed findings of fact.
These findings are then submitted to the district courts, which
are given the power of de novo review." 5 Over core matters, on
the other hand, bankruptcy courts wield more complete
jurisdiction, and although their decisions can be reviewed by
district courts, review occurs only under the far more deferential
16
standard of clear error."
In some cases, bankruptcy courts can also wield this
broader form of jurisdiction over non-core matters, but only if
11.113

113.
(2)

28 U.S.C. § 157(b) states, in relevant part, that:
Core proceedings include, but are not limited to (A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions
from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interests for the
purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of title 11 but not the
liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or
wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case
under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the
estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of
cash collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting
from claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims
against the estate; and
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate
or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder
relationship, except personal injury tort or wrongful death claims.
(3) The bankruptcy judge shall determine, on the judge's own motion or on
timely motion of a party, whether a proceeding is a core proceeding under this
subsection or is a proceeding that is otherwise related to a case under title 11.
A determination that a proceeding is not a core proceeding shall not be made
solely on the basis that its resolution may be affected by State law.
(4) Non-core proceedings under section 157(b)(2)(B) of title 28, United States
Code, shall not be subject to the mandatory abstention provisions of section
1334(c)(2).
114. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
115. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9033.
116. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).
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one of two situations exists: either both parties must consent to
this jurisdiction, or the relevant district court must abstain from
rehearing the principal issues in the case. 117 District courts
have the discretion to abstain in this manner, and by doing so,
they can effectively relegate to bankruptcy courts complete
jurisdiction over non-core issues. 118 In practice, district courts
rarely rehear bankruptcy court determinations and, in fact,
almost "every federal district in America has entered an
omnibus order pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(a) [which] refer[s]
all present and future bankruptcy cases and proceedings to the
bankruptcy judges of the [relevant] district." 119 This means that
in practice, the same sorts of claims that were held to require
Article III adjudication under Northern Pipeline are often
adjudicated completely in non-Article III forums.
While Congress was altering the bankruptcy code to try to
meet Northern Pipeline'sArticle III challenge, the Court was reexamining Article III itself and issued several opinions that
arguably expand the scope of legitimate bankruptcy court
jurisdiction. First, in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural
Productions Corp.,120 the Court reinterpreted the distinction
between private and public rights, which had traditionally
served as an important basis for dividing Article III from nonArticle III claims.' 2 ' Rather than limiting public rights to ones
in which the government was a party to the suit, the Court held
that:
Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its
constitutional powers under Article I, may create a seemingly
'private' right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory
resolution with
scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency
122
limited involvement by the Article III judiciary.

Union Carbide thereby created an exception to Northern
Pipeline's formalistic approach to Article III not only when the
government is a party, but also when the legal basis for a claim
is part of a broad and complex regulatory scheme. Part of the
rationale cited for this expansion was that adjudications of these
sorts of rights will often demand the peculiar competence of a

117.
118.
119.
(1998).
120.
121.
122.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(c) & (d), 1334 (c).
The power of abstention is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (1994).
1 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 2D § 4:18
473 U.S. 568 (1985).
Id. at 593-94.
Id.
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given agency, either in understanding that area of regulatory
law or when a substantive policy decision had to be made. 123 In
principle, this holding would thus seem to pave the way for an
argument that bankruptcy courts should be able to adjudicate
any claims that involve special forms of regulation for entities at
or near insolvency. 124 This argument might, in turn, legitimate
a broader range of bankruptcy court jurisdiction than was
allowed under Northern Pipeline.
In the meantime, the Court also abandoned Northern
Pipeline's formalistic approach to Article III. In Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,125 the Court hearkened
back to an approach much like the balancing test championed in
Justice White's dissent in Northern Pipeline.126 Under Schor's
new functional approach to Article III, even non-congressionallycreated rights can be adjudicated in Article I tribunals so long as
the following five criteria are met: Article I adjudication is
necessary to effect an otherwise valid agency scheme, the range
of rights thus delegated is narrow, the corresponding legal
decisions are subject to de novo review, the corresponding
factual findings are subject to a weight of the evidence review,
and the litigants are free to opt for a district court in the first
instance. 127
Because this test no longer limits Article I
jurisdiction to congressionally-created rights, this holding might
also seem to legitimate a broader delegation of jurisdiction to
bankruptcy courts than is found under the present code. The
current state of the law thus demands a closer inquiry into the
proper constitutional bounds of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.
II. THE HOBSON'S CHOICE BETWEEN AN EFFICIENT BANKRUPTCY
SYSTEM AND AN INDEPENDENT FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND THE
MOVE TO A CONTEXT-BASED APPROACH TO ARTICLE III

Together, Article III and the present bankruptcy code
present a genuine dilemma. This section exposes this dilemma

123.

Id. at 590 ("To hold otherwise would be to defeat the obvious purpose of the

legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing
with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and
determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task.") (quoting
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932)).
124. But see infra Section II (discussing constitutionality of bankruptcy under Schor
and concluding that even present scheme is arguably unconstitutional).
125. 478 U.S. 833(1986).
126. See 458 U.S. at 113 (White, J., dissenting).
127. 478 U.S. at 853-56.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/4

24

Bankruptcy Law Tell Us About
Article III
1999 Kar: What Can
BANKRUPTCYAND
ARTICLE
IIIand Vice Versa?439

by showing, in Section II.A, that under the current state of the
law, Article III generates
unneeded
and sometimes
unconscionable inefficiencies in the bankruptcy context. Section
II.B argues that any attempt to resolve this problem that
proceeds from within the framework of Article III's current
jurisprudence would threaten the independence of the federal
judiciary. Because the latter value is more fundamental, the
law has generally taken the former course, which represents the
lesser of two clear evils. Section II.C diagnoses this Hobson's
choice as deriving from an unexamined reliance on the so-called
"sourcing premise," however, and develops an alternative,
context-based approach to Article III that will alleviate the need
to face the difficult choice in the first place.
A. Threats to Bankruptcy Policy
As discussed below, ambiguities in the Court's present
Article III jurisprudence have caused many theorists and
litigants to question the constitutionality of the present
bankruptcy scheme.
This section explores several of the
challenges that have been leveled against the scheme and then
develops the thesis that the primary purposes of bankruptcy law
are undermined by the Code's questionable constitutional
pedigree.
Generally speaking, Article III challenges to the present
bankruptcy code have taken one of two basic forms. The first,
which draws on Northern Pipeline's approach to Article III, is
perhaps the weakest but has the putative advantage of drawing
on the most clearly controlling case for analyzing the
constitutionality of bankruptcy court jurisdiction. As stated
earlier, Northern Pipeline allows for wholesale exceptions to
Article III in three broad classes of cases: military cases, cases
brought before territorial courts and disputes involving the
government as a party. 128 Modern bankruptcy courts fit none of
these descriptions, 129 however, and thus Northern Pipeline's
analysis will not warrant a wholesale exception to Article III for
bankruptcy courts.
Our present bankruptcy court does, however, allot differing

128. See 458 U.S. at 64-70.
129. Of course, suits where the government is a party can be part of modern
bankruptcy proceedings.
This would, however, be a contingent feature of the
proceedings, and nothing about bankruptcy makes such cases more or less likely to occur

than is normal.
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levels of Article III review depending on whether bankruptcy
courts are adjudicating core or non-core claims, 130 and one might
therefore try to argue that the present code meets the standard
for hybrid Article I/Article III systems set out in Northern
Pipeline.131 To do this, one must show that in the present hybrid
system, Article III tribunals maintain jurisdiction over noncongressionally created rights and maintain at least the
"essential attributes of judicial power" with regard to
congressionally created rights.
The present bankruptcy code does not maintain these
essential attributes. One of the essential attributes of judicial
power under Northern Pipeline is the power to issue enforceable
orders. 132 Rather than reserving this power to the Article III
courts, however, the present code grants it directly to the
bankruptcy courts, 133 and this power is in fact exercised in
nearly every case. 134 Moreover, Northern Pipeline allows for
only "narrow" delegations of judicial power to Article I tribunals
in hybrid systems, and this narrowness requirement pertains to
the type, rather than the number, of cases delegated. 35 The
present code, by contrast, grants bankruptcy courts jurisdiction,
in the first instance, over any claims involving a creditor that
may have economic consequence on a debtor's estate. 36 These
will include most private law contract and tort claims, as well as
many constitutional and other paradigmatically-Article III
claims.
This delegation thus violates Northern Pipeline's
narrowness requirement.
Finally, Northern Pipeline's test for the validity of hybrid
systems applies only to systems adjudicating congressionally
created rights. 13 7 All other rights must be adjudicated in the
first instance by an Article III court, under Northern Pipeline.
The present bankruptcy code, however, delegates bankruptcy

130. See supra notes 109-119 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 67-97 and accompanying text.
132. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85-86.
133. See 28 U.S.C. § 157 (allowing bankruptcy courts to issue enforceable orders
when exercising jurisdiction over core matters).
134.

See 1 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRupTcy LAW AND PRACTICE 2D

§ 4:18 (1998).
135. See 458 U.S. at 63.
136. See, e.g., Pacor v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984) ("The ...test for
determining whether a civil proceeding is related to bankruptcy is whether the outcome
of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in
bankruptcy.").
137. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 80-81.
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courts jurisdiction over any claim that arises from the same
factual background as those in the reorganization or dissolution
in question, a delegation that will sometimes include jurisdiction
over constitutional and other non-congressionally created
rights. 138 If Northern Pipeline were to control the analysis, the
present bankruptcy code would therefore be unconstitutional.
Most theorists and judges would, however, reject the
contention that Northern Pipeline alone controls the analysis.
Although the case is directly on point, and although it has not
been overturned, many of its central tenets have gone through
important transformations, at least in non-bankruptcy contexts,
as explained above. 139 The constitutionality of the code should
therefore be examined under the Court's Article III
40
jurisprudence as modified by Schor' and Union Carbide.11
Even under these more recent rulings, the bankruptcy code
faces several constitutional problems. This is because both
Schor and Union Carbide expand the scope of the legitimate
non-Article III jurisdiction along axes that are ultimately
inapplicable to the bankruptcy context. Union Carbide, for
example, makes an exception to Article III for claims that are
142
highly integrated into a complex, public regulatory scheme.
In Union Carbide,the Court described its notion of "integration"
as one that encompasses legal integration only, i.e., as one that
encompasses rights and obligations that find their source in the
same type of regulatory scheme. 143 The interpretation and
elaboration of these rights will often require an agency's special
expertise, and the Court cited this interpretive expertise as the
primary ground for the exception.144
By contrast, bankruptcy courts adjudicate some rights that
have their source in the Constitution and state law.145 Although
these claims are sometimes "highly integrated" into the
proceedings in the sense that they are factually interrelated
with issues that the bankruptcy courts will ultimately
determine, this factual integration is not the sort of integration

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

28 U.S.C. § 157.
supraSection I.C.
478 U.S. 833 (1986).
473 U.S. 568 (1985).
id. at 594.
Union Carbide,473 U.S. at 569, 589.
id. at 590-91.
28 U.S.C. § 157.
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spoken of in Union Carbide.146 Consequently, bankruptcy court
jurisdiction over these sorts of claims cannot be rooted in Union
Carbide's expanded public rights doctrine.
For similar reasons, Schor's functional analysis of Article III
cannot be used to legitimate the present code's jurisdiction.
Although Schor's functional test allows Article I tribunals to
adjudicate some private rights, and might thus be used to
legitimate the adjudication of rights deriving from sources other
than broad regulatory schemes, Schor also stipulates that the
range of private rights so delegated must be narrow. 14v In this
sense, Schor is very reminiscent of Northern Pipeline.
Bankruptcy proceedings can, however, in principle incorporate
any type of private claim that may have economic ramifications
on a debtor's estate, and so the present code would seem to
148
violate Schor's narrowness requirement as well.
One might point out that the circumstances in which
bankruptcy proceedings arise are limited to situations where a
debtor is at or near insolvency 149 and then argue that this
limitation should provide the necessary means of narrowing
what would otherwise be a wholesale redistribution of judicial
power. This limitation is, however, not only dependent on
changing economic circumstances but ignores the fact that
Schor, like Northern Pipeline, requires narrowness in terms of
type rather than number of cases adjudicated. 50 For these
reasons, neither the Court's new public rights doctrine nor its
new functional approach to Article III will legitimate the
bankruptcy code's expanded bankruptcy court jurisdiction.
This legacy leaves an even deeper problem concerning the
legitimacy of bankruptcy law from the perspective of social
policy. In the bankruptcy context, where resources are scarce
and often diminishing, utilitarian concerns for efficiency take on
a particularly central value. Indeed, most would agree that
there is good reason for bankruptcy law in general, and that
there would be little justification for it if it could not efficiently

146. See 473 U.S. at 593.
147. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 854 ("W]e are persuaded that the congressional
authorization of limited CFTC jurisdiction over a narrow class of common law claims as
an incident to the CFTC's primary, and unchallenged, adjudicative function does not
create a substantial threat to the separation of powers.") (emphasis added).
148. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157.
149. See id.
150. See 478 U.S. at 854 (limiting its holding to adjudication of a "narrow class of
common law claims").
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aid in reorganizing or dissolving a debtor's assets. 151 For this
reason, even theorists who would otherwise reject utilitarian
reasoning in the name of more agent-centered or deontological
values would presumably be willing to agree that efficiency
should be a hallmark concern of bankruptcy courts. For these
latter theorists, efficiency could be viewed as important because
it helps protect the rights of all the parties involved.
The problem with the present state of the law, then, is that
it invites inefficiencies on two distinct levels. First, by leaving
the proper bounds of bankruptcy court jurisdiction questionable
with regard to Article III, it either invites constitutional
challenges by parties seeking leverage or tactical delay, 15 2 or
draws limits on bankruptcy court jurisdiction that are too
narrow given the need for an efficient resolution of debtors'
entitlements in one forum. Second, by instating the ambiguous
core/non-core distinction in an attempt to meet these
constitutional concerns, the present code recreates the
inefficiencies of the pre-1978 plenary/summary jurisdiction
distinction in a new guise. Once again, under the new code,
parties seeking leverage or tactical delay can threaten to litigate
the core/non-core distinction or split claims arising from the

151. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRuPTcy LAW AND PRACTICE
2D § 23:5 (1997); John P. Musone, Crystallizing the Intellectual Property Licenses in
Bankruptcy Act: A Proposed Solution to Achieve Congress'Intent, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 509,
540 (1997) ("[Elfficiency is an increasingly important hallmark of bankruptcy law,
especially since one of the chief purposes of replacing the Bankruptcy Act with the
Bankruptcy Code was to make the bankruptcy system more efficient."). But see Robert
E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for FinancialRehabilitation
of the Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515, 519-20 (1991) (suggesting that
"the central justification for the debtor financial relief provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
is founded in a natural law theory of morality."); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start
Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1395-1424 (1985) (discussing broad
range of normative theories in application to bankruptcy).
152. Some theorists have, in fact, used the above arguments to suggest the
somewhat fanciful idea that bankruptcy judges simply are tenured and protected by the
Constitution against salary diminution. See, e.g., Hon. Leif M. Clark, 16 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 38 (1997). This argument begins with the premise that Article III is selfexecuting. Relying on arguments roughly analogous to the ones above, proponents of
this view argue that the present bankruptcy courts already have the "essential
attributes" of Article III courts. If bankruptcy courts are Article III courts, and if Article
III automatically guarantees life tenure and protections against salary diminution, then
by strict implication bankruptcy judges must have these protections. This theory is
fanciful because it draws a conclusion that is politically unviable and relies on an
outmoded analysis of Article III. Nevertheless, the theory exemplifies the type of
ingenuity courts will encounter from litigants willing to exploit ambiguities in the
Court's present Article III jurisprudence to undermine confidence in the scope of our
present bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction.
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same factual proceedings into different forums. 153 This can lead
to needless and sometimes unconscionable externalities and to
the systematic advantage of certain types of creditors at the
creditor meetings. Thus, once again, the present bankruptcy
system verges on illegitimacy from the perspective of social
policy.'54
B. Threats to the FederalJudiciary
One might try to resolve the policy problems outlined in the
last section by expanding bankruptcy court jurisdiction in a
manner consistent with one of the traditional approaches to
Article III. This section demonstrates, however, that any such
attempt would invite endless inroads into the independence of
the federal judiciary.
The approach to Article III endorsed in Northern Pipeline is
a perfect case in point. Because Northern Pipeline distinguished
congressionally-created from non-congressionally created rights
and then articulated a general test for Article III validity for
55
hybrid systems that adjudicate congressionally-created rights,
there are two basic methods that one might employ to expand
bankruptcy court jurisdiction under this framework. First, the
Court might weaken the general requirements needed for hybrid
systems to preserve "the essential attributes of judicial power"
in an Article III tribunal. Although this approach would expand
the limits of legitimate bankruptcy court jurisdiction, this
expansion would be ineffective to meet the specific problems of
bankruptcy policy elucidated above.
Under the Northern
Pipeline framework, the analysis for hybrid systems applies only
to congressionally-created rights. 56
Consequently, this
approach would fail to legitimate an expansion over the other
types of rights that are often needed to handle bankruptcy
proceedings in an efficient manner.
In order to expand the limits of legitimate bankruptcy court
jurisdiction in the manner needed, the Court would thus have to
153. See G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. et al., Review of the Proposals of the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission Pertainingto Business Bankruptcies:Part One, 53 BUS.
LAW. 1381, 1435-40 (1998).
154. One way of getting at this point is to say that few rational creditors or debtors
could consent to this bankruptcy law behind a suitably-defined veil of ignorance.
155. See supra Section I.B.
156. Moreover, the expansion would greatly diminish Article III courts' power over
congressionally-created rights in contexts other than bankruptcy and would thus
threaten some of the independence of the federal judiciary.
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extend Article I jurisdiction to non-congressionally created
rights, and use Northern Pipeline's general test for Article III
validity in application to these rights. Without doubt, this
approach would meet the problems of the last approach by
paving an avenue for bankruptcy court jurisdiction over
constitutional and state law claims.
It would, however,
simultaneously place all legal claims within the purview of
Article I courts, and would thus cause a wholesale redistribution
of judicial power from Article III to Article I tribunals. Because
this Article III analysis would apply not only to bankruptcy but
to all Article I courts, this redistribution would not only threaten
but severely threaten the independence of the federal judiciary.
For these reasons, neither of these expansions of the Northern
Pipeline doctrine can be used to resolve the problems inherent in
157
bankruptcy.
Fortunately, the Northern Pipeline framework is not the
only option, and one might try to resolve the problems
elaborated in the last section by modifying the Court's present
functionalist test for Article III instead.
This test seems
particularly well-suited to the task because it already allows for
narrow delegations of judicial power to non-Article III tribunals
so long as certain values are preserved, including those for:
impartiality, checks and balances, separation of powers,
individual rights and the narrowness of delegations to Article I
forums of Article III claims.158 To expand bankruptcy court
jurisdiction, the Court need only allow for broader delegations.
This sort of approach would, however, yield several counterintuitive results. First, contrary to the ordinary way that
constitutional mandates are perceived, this approach suggests
that Congress can redistribute judicial power whenever it has a
strong enough interest in doing so. As noted before, however,
many consider certain rights, such as constitutional and
common law rights as having a deontological structure: they
serve as trumps on utilitarian or majoritarian reasoning. 5 9
Allowing these rights to be adjudicated by institutions that are
strongly accountable to the electorate whenever Congress, which
is similarly accountable, thinks there is a strong enough reason
157. Perhaps because of these problems, the Court has attempted to meet the need
for a stronger rationale for bankruptcy court jurisdiction by expanding the public rights
exception to Article Im.
158. See generally Schor, 478 U.S. 833.
159. See RONALD DwoRiuN, LAW's EMPIRE at 243-44 (1986); DwOiuN, supra note
11, at 96-97.
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to do so would thus threaten the very status of these rights.
Such an allowance would conflict with some of the central
purposes behind our system of checks and balances and
160
separation of powers.
This danger is further exacerbated because under this
functionalist approach, Congress could achieve a wholesale
redistribution of judicial power in small stages. Although the
Court's test allows only for "narrow" delegations to Article I
courts, and only when Congress has an "overriding reason" for
trumping Article III's ordinary concerns, these limitations only
prevent Congress from generating a wholesale redistribution of
judicial power by means of a single statute. Congress is in no
way prevented from achieving the same net effect by creating a
large number of highly specialized courts to take care of each
discrete area of the law, and this problem will only be
exacerbated if the analysis is allowed to validate broader
delegations of judicial power to non-Article III tribunals.
Finally, the Court's functionalist approach suggests that the
judicial power of interpreting the law is at its lowest, in our
tripartite system, when Congress has exerted its power to make
the law. To the contrary, basic conceptions of parity would
suggest that the power of the United States Judiciary to
interpret the law should extend as far as Congress's power to
create the law.161 The Court's present functionalist approach to
Article III thus buys greater jurisdiction for Article I courts at a
very costly expense and leaves endangered not only important
constitutional rights but fundamental concerns about the proper
structure of our federal government.
C. Diagnosisof the Problem and a CloserLook at Rights in
Context
As shown in Sections II.A and II.B above, the Court's two
predominant theories of Article III undermine either the power
of the federal judiciary or the underpinnings of bankruptcy law
160.
See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 13-17 (1990).

THE

RIGHTS

REVOLUTION:

161. For the classic presentation of this view, see Martin H. Redish, JudicialParity,
Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and
ConstitutionalRights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329 (1988). See also Michael Wells, Behind the
Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts,
71 B.U. L. REV. 609 (1991); Akhil Reed Amar, Comment, Parity as a Constitutional
Question, 71 B.U. L. REV. 645 (1991); Susan N. Herman, Comment, Why ParityMatters,
71 B.U. L. REV. 651 (1991).
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from the perspective of social policy. Indeed, the same forces
that threaten the efficiency of bankruptcy courts will limit the
strength and scope of the administrative state more generally
because this state is dependent in large part on the ability of
regulatory agencies, which are Article I institutions, to perform
quasi-adjudicatory functions. These facts invite the question
whether there is not some common premise running through our
present approaches to Article III and whether this Hobson's
choice can be avoided by challenging that premise.
There is a common premise running through these
approaches. Each of the approaches to Article III examined
above-that of Northern Pipeline,162 the balancing approach
from Justice White's dissent, 163 and the more functionalist
approach outlined in Schor'64--reflects what this article has
called the "sourcing premise." The premise comes in a weak and
a strong form. 65 In its weak form, it holds that whether an
exercise of judicial power will be necessary to adjudicate a right
will depend predominantly on the source of the right-whether,
for example, it derives from the Constitution, from a
congressional mandate or from state law. This premise is
reflected in the Court's present functionalist approach to Article
III, which separates congressionally-created rights from
constitutional and state-law rights and allows for broader or
narrower exceptions to Article III, respectively, with respect to
each class. 66 In its strong form, the sourcing premise holds that
the source of a right can strictly determine the outcome of the
Article III analysis. Northern Pipeline reflects this stronger
67
premise because it suggests that as a general rule,
constitutional and state-law claims must be adjudicated in
68
Article III tribunals.
This section examines the force of the sourcing premise but

162. 458 U.S. 50.
163. Id. at 105 (White, J., dissenting).
164. 478 U.S. 833.
165. For an example of this approach, see NorthernPipeline, 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
166. This approach requires an exercise of judicial power for the adjudication of
constitutional and state law claims, but then allows for "narrow" delegations of this
judicial power to Article I tribunals whenever the delegation will not threaten our
overarching system of checks and balances. See generally Schor, 478 U.S. 833. The
approach then allows a more wholesale distribution of jurisdiction over congressionallycreated rights, so long as the rights are part of a broad regulatory scheme. See generally

id.
167.
168.

"As a general rule" means bracketing the historical exceptions.
See 458 U.S. at 84-87.
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argues that the premise ultimately rests on an overly simplified
view of the relation between rights, majoritarianism and
different conceptions of value. The section ends by examining
the role that context can play in filling out this overly simplified
picture.
1. The Sourcing Premise and Its View of Rights
In order to determine the proper role that the sourcing
premise should play in our legal reasoning, it will be helpful to
examine how this reasoning works, beginning with the more
primary processes of moral reasoning. Consider the case of
promising, which serves as the basis for one of the most
fundamental types of moral claims that we make on one
another. The steps that our ordinary moral reasoning takes
with regard to promises can be schematized as follows:
Moral/Normative Principle: If A promises Z to do X, then A
ought to do X; or, alternatively, promises of this sort
generate rights on the part of Z to have A perform X.
Factual Premise:
Application/Conclusion:

Person F promised G to do Y.
Person F ought to do Y
or, alternatively, G has
a right to have F perform Y.

This structure of reasoning can, in turn, be generalized and
placed into a legal framework. The paradigmatic steps in our
legal reasoning would then look as follows:
Legal/Normative Principle: For all X & Y, if X has property
Pa, and Y has property Pb, then X ought to perform A for
Y; or, alternatively, Y has a right to have X perform A.
Factual Premise:
F has property Pa, and G has
property Pb.
Application/Conclusion:

F ought to perform A or,
alternatively, G has a right to
have F perform A.

Viewed from this perspective, the sourcing premise seems to
reflect a very powerful notion of how rights function and the role
that majoritarian concerns should play in our legal reasoning.
In the schematisms above, the notion of a "right" is given
content by the legal principles that are articulated in the first
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/4
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step of the legal syllogism. In this sense, legal principles can be
said to generate the legal rights in question. Legal principles
derived from congressionally-based laws are, however, thought
to reflect pre-eminently majoritarian concerns, whereas
principles derived from such sources as the Constitution are
thought to preserve counter-majoritarian values, or values that
either individuals or minority groups can assert against the
majority. If, in the process of articulating or interpreting the
legal principles that are binding, the institution that performs
these tasks is particularly responsive to the electorate, then
majoritarian concerns would seem more likely to eviscerate the
values that underlie counter-majoritarian or deontological
principles.
By contrast, principles that are in no way
deontological or agent-centered, but are simply meant to help
achieve straightforward majoritarian goals, would seem to be
properly articulated and interpreted by tribunals that are more
responsive to an electorate. In the United States, courts have
the task of interpreting legal principles in application to
particular cases. It would thus appear appropriate for the
courts that interpret these principles to be more or less
responsive to the electorate depending on the source of the
principle interpreted.
In fact, the sourcing premise also seems to take account of a
rather deep distinction in the types of value that a legal system
can generate. In value theory, there are generally said to be two
main types of theories concerning the sources, or types, of value
that are possible. 169 On the one hand, there are utilitarian
theories, which define the "good" in terms of happiness, or
satisfaction, and then define the "right," in terms of the good, as
170
that principle or action that helps maximize this good.
Majoritarian conceptions of lawmaking seem best tailored to
reflect a utilitarian conception of the good because
majoritarianism attempts to calculate the maximal satisfaction
across citizens and then allows the results of these calculations
to determine what legal principles will be binding.
Deontological theories, by contrast, define the concept of the

169. See generally Michael P. Zuckert, Do Natural Rights Derive from Natural
Law?, 20 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POLY 695, 705 (1997) (referencing "[t]he well-known
classification of systems into consequentialist and deontological within contemporary
moral and political philosophy").
170. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 16, at 22-27 (defining consequentialist theories as
ones in which the good is "defined independently from the right, and then the right is
defined as that which maximizes the good.").
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"right" as primary, and view certain principles as binding even
if, as a consequence, action in accordance with those principles
will sometimes lead to less than optimal satisfaction as
calculated across all relevant persons. 17 1
By dividing
jurisdiction over adjudications that involve legal principles
reflecting utilitarian and deontological conceptions of value into
forums that are more or less responsive to the electorate,
respectively, the sourcing premise would thus appear to help
foster a legal system that can generate both of these competing
forms of value.
2. Some Problems with the Sourcing Premiseand Its Conception
of Rights
Despite the power of the sourcing premise, it ultimately
pictures the relationship between rights, majoritarianism and
utilitarian conceptions of the value in an overly simplistic
manner. To see this will require several stages of reasoning.
First, one must recognize that for the notion of an individual
right to have any teeth, it must, by definition, be viewed as more
than just an interest. It must amount to something that an
individual right-bearer can assert to trump certain classes of
countervailing interests. 172 If, however, rights must have the
power to trump some utilitarian concerns, then it is difficult to
understand how laws that do nothing more than reflect
utilitarian concerns could ever generate such rights.
By
distinguishing majoritarian and counter-majoritarian rights on
the basis of the difference between utilitarian and deontological
conceptions of value, the sourcing premise thus makes it difficult
to understand how a large class of legal rights could even
function as rights.
This problem can be resolved by noting that the United
States legal system contains a well-developed conception of the
rule of law, and a well-developed notion that like cases should be
treated alike. 173 These conceptions mandate that even if a legal

171. See generally id. at 30 (defining deontological theories as ones that either do
'not specify the good independently from the right, or [do] not interpret the right as
maximizing the good"); see also ANDERSON, supra note 19.
172. Dworkin's work best explicates the notion that for something to be a right, it
must play a trump in legal reasoning. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1988).

173. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, 'THE RULE OF LAW" AS A CONCEPT IN
CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1997) ("Respect for the Rule of
Law is central to our political and rhetorical traditions, possibly even to our sense of
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principle is chosen or interpreted by a majoritarian institution,
the principle should be given general application and should
apply equally to all persons. Thus, even with regard to rights
that derive from congressional legislation, a person who bears
that right will sometimes be able to assert it to trump the
interests of others when, for example, a uniform interpretation
of the right in application to the particular case would mandate
the preclusion of these other interests.
One way to clarify this point is to look at the schematisms of
legal reasoning set forth above. 174 From these schematisms, it
should be apparent that majoritarian concerns can affect a
process of legal reasoning not only at the first step where
principles are chosen and interpreted, but also at the second
step where facts are determined or at the third step where the
law is applied to the facts. Once this has been acknowledged,
congressionally-created rights can be seen to attain their status
as rights by repressing the majoritarian calculus at the point of
application, rather than at the point of interpretation-i.e., at
the third step rather than the first. If majoritarianism reflects a
pre-eminently utilitarian conception of value, then a new
paradox will thus arise: it will seem puzzling that utilitarianism
would ever allow for this sort of repression of majoritarian
concerns.
Utilitarian theorists ultimately have an answer to this
paradox as well, but it is one that will only further demonstrate
how overly simplified the sourcing premise is. In particular,
many utilitarians believe that the good of the whole is reached
not by making a substantive utilitarian calculation at each point
where a decision is made, but by choosing those rules that will
best maximize the good of the whole and then giving these rules
general application. 175 These so-called "rule" utilitarians cite
three main reasons for this view. First, they point out that
there are costs associated with making utilitarian calculations
in the first place. 176 As these decisions become more complex
and require more information and more substantive fact-finding,
national identity."); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974) (noting the United
States's "historic commitment to the rule of law"); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) ( "The rule of law.., is the great mucilage that holds society
together."); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 346 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting) (observing
that "this country" is "dedicated" to the rule of law).
174. See supra Section II.C.1.
175. -See, e.g., Richard B. Brandt, Some Merits of One Form of Rule-Utilitarianism,3
U. OF COLO. STUD. SERIES IN PHIL. 39, 58 (1967).
176. Id. at 39.
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it can sometimes be more efficient to evaluate decisions at a
general level, formulate rules, and then forego the costly
decision-making process in the particular case. 177 These kinds of
benefits can, in turn, outweigh the costs associated with the fact
that some applications of the rule will be less than optimal. 178
Second, there can be substantive utility in the rule of law
itself. 7 9 The rule of law not only allows individuals to
understand what the law requires and adjust their behavior
accordingly, 180 it also generates greater trust in, and so potential
consent to, the governing system.' 8 ' The rule of law can thus
inherit some of the value asociated with a stable social
structure. Finally, with regard to large co-ordinative ventures,
rules stated in general language allow individuals to understand
and act upon the shared principles for action that make these
ventures possible. The rule of law can thereby inherit the value
associated with the possibility of these large-scale cooperative
ventures. For these reasons, straightforward utilitarian reasons
can be cited for repressing the majoritarian calculus when. legal
principles are applied to the facts in the processes of valid legal
2
reasoning. 8
Several points follow. First, in the process of articulating
and applying the legal principles that generate congressionallycreated rights, both majoritarian and counter-majoritarian
incentives seem to be appropriate at different junctures.
Second, utilitarian theories of value can themselves recommend
both a reliance on and a suppression of majoritarian interests at
different points in these processes. In no way, then, is there a
one-to-one relationship between congressionally-created rights,
177. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword:The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARv. L. REV. 22, 63 (1992) ("[R]ules promote economies for the legal decisionmaker by
minimizing the elaborate, time-consuming, and repetitive application of background
principles to facts.") (footnote omitted).
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in
ConstitutionalDiscourse,97 COLuM. L. REV. 1 (1997).
180. See Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation,DemocraticLegitimacy
and Legal-System Values, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 233, 242-45 (1997).
181. Id.
182. For utilitarian arguments in favor of the rule of law and rules, see generally
Sullivan, supra note 177; see also Richard Tuck, The Dangers of Natural Rights, 20
HARV. J.L. & PuB. POLY 683, 683-84 (1997) ("[Olne of the first things that students
learning about the history of ideas are taught is that the great Utilitarian philosophers
were also notable fighters for a range of civil rights in their societies. Extension of the
franchise, transparent government, press freedom, and the rule of law were all
energetically championed by Jeremy Bentham and early Benthamites such as James
Mill and John Austin.") (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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majoritarian institutions and a utilitarian conception of valueas the sourcing premise would have it.
If congressionally created rights have a less direct and
straightforward relation to majoritarianism than the sourcing
premise would suggest, then so too do other rights, which appear
by their nature to be more strictly counter-majoritarian. These
are agent-centered or deontological rights, and they normally
derive from either the Constitution or the common law.18 3 The
distinguishing feature of these rights is that they do not merely
reflect a decision that the type of right is valuable as a valuable
state of affairs.1 84 If-to the contrary-value were to attach to a
state of affairs whenever that type of right were preserved, then
it would seem to follow that the State could legitimately violate
one of these rights in order to prevent a larger number of similar
violations from occurring. 8 5 Deontological principles, however,
give the duty to each agent, including the State, not to violate
any such right, even if by doing so the agent could prevent
others from violating more of the same class.18 6 At first blush,
deontological principles thus seem to provide an even more
fundamental trump on majoritarian reasoning and one that
bears no relation to utilitarian conceptions of value at all.
Non-congressionally created rights can, however, also be
viewed as having a relation to majoritarianism and
utilitarianism that is not obscure. This is because utilitarian
theories share a common feature: namely, if belief in a
particular theory of value that diverges from strict
utilitarianism will increase the overall utility in a system,
utilitarianism will recommend that agents adopt and believe
that other theory instead of strict utilitarianism. 87 Within
value theory, this phenomenon is referred to as the fact that
utilitarian theories can be "self-effacing": they can recommend
the adoption of decision-procedures, or rules of recognition, that
goals.'18
utilitarian
pursue
self-consciously
not
do
183. See generallyDWORKIN, supra note 11.
184. See generallyANDERSON, supra note 19, at 1-16.
185. In fact, some theorists have claimed that all rights must be viewed to have this
sort of consequence because there can be no underlying rationale for other types of
See, e.g., SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM: A
rights.
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING RIVAL MORAL

CONCEPTIONS 80-114 (1982) (rev. ed. 1994).
186. See ANDERSON, supra note 19, at 73.
187. See id.
188. This term was first introduced by Derek Parfit, but the general idea can be
found even as early as Bentham. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 23, 40-42
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Utilitarianism can thus justify certain deviations from
straightforward utilitarian reasoning, 8 9 and the fact that a
right bears a relation to majoritarianism but also trumps the
majoritarian calculus in some cases is a feature of both "countermajoritarian" and "majoritarian" rights. By attempting to
divide jurisdiction on the basis of whether the source of a claim
suggests that it reflects inherently majoritarian or inherently
countermajoritarian concerns, the sourcing premise overlooks
this complex interplay.
3. The Role that Context Plays in Determininga Claim of Right
Once one identifies the concerns that justify a move from
straightforward utilitarian reasoning to rule utilitarianism, and,
in turn, a move from rule utilitarianism to its self-effacement, 190
the source of a right will be seen to play only an indirect role in
determining its proper place of adjudication. Naturally, certain
principles will sometimes warrant presumptive treatment by
one or another type of tribunal, and in such cases it may be
appropriate to lay these principles down in different legal
documents and create a division of institutions that have the
primary responsibility for interpreting these different
documents.
As the considerations in the last subsection
demonstrate, however, the concerns that justify placing a
principle in one or another document will also warrant
departures from the sourcing premise in the particular case.
One way to identify these concerns is to begin with some
commonplace examples. There are numerous phenomena that
show how not every interpretation of a legal right and not every
application of law to the facts can constitute an exercise of
judicial power. Members of the executive branch, for example,
must interpret the law and apply it to the facts daily in their
practices of investigation, prosecution and law enforcement. No
one would, however, consider these to be exercises of judicial
power, performable only by officials with life tenure and
protections against salary diminution. To use a more subtle
example which has sometimes been discussed, consider the case
of two persons who bet on the meaning of a given federal
(1984) (defining self-effacement and demonstrating that the phenomenon arises in both
self-interest theories of rationality and consequentialist theories of morality).
189. Elizabeth Anderson has argued that the scope of self-effacement has, in fact,
been vastly underestimated by most utilitarian theorists. ANDERSON, supra note 19, at
17-43, 86-90.
190. For a description of these moves, see generally supra Section II.C.2.
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statute. Although the bet may be construed as giving rise to a
claim under state law, i.e., one that will require an exercise of
state judicial power to adjudicate, the need for an interpretation
of the federal statute itself will not serve as a basis for federal
jurisdiction over the matter. Federal judicial power is simply
not exercised in deciding what the federal statute means in this
kind of case because the legal consequences of the interpretation
will only have effect via the state law contract claim. In both of
these cases, the context in which the claim arises affects
whether interpretation and application of the legal principles
that give rise to the claim will require an exercise of judicial
power under Article III. The role that context can play in
affecting this sort of determination should therefore be
scrutinized more closely.
The most obvious way to see how the context in which a
right is asserted can affect the legal conclusions that should be
drawn from the assertion is to look at the role that consent can
play in this process. 191 Most theorists consider consent by the
relevant right-holder to be sufficient to overcome the
presumption reflected in a right, 92 except in the narrow class of
rights that are generally called "inalienable" rights. 93 Consent,
however, does not as it stands play a role in deciding how a
principle should be interpreted, and so may not seem to have
any valid effect on its place of adjudication. To the extent that
counter-majoritarian principles are meant only to ensure
fairness to an individual, however, consent to adjudication of a
principle by a tribunal that is less apt to protect this value
would seem to justify an abrogation of the presumption under
discussion. Thus, consent to Article I jurisdiction often plays a
large role in allowing for such adjudications under the Court's
traditional approaches to Article III.
There are, moreover, two other important ways that context
can be important in our legal and moral reasoning. First, as
stated above, the context can indicate something important
about the class of reasons that a claim excludes. For example, if

191. See generally,ANDERSON, supra note 19.
192. For a discussion of the role that consent plays in waiving rights in the criminal
context, see William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV.
761 (1989).
193. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 SoC.
PHIL. & POL'Y 179, 185 (1986) ("To characterize a right as inalienable is to claim that the
consent of the right-holder is insufficient to extinguish the right or to transfer it to
another.").

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1999

41

456

LAW
REVIEW
MontanaMONTANA
Law Review, Vol.
60 [1999],
Iss. 2, Art. 4

Vol. 60

the schematisms of legal reasoning outlined in Section II.C.1
were to take place in the absence of an overarching state that
could sanction individuals and enforce the judgments of the
relevant tribunals, an impartial interpretation of the right
would not, in and of itself, generate any guarantee of
vindication. To the extent that a given right is meant to
guarantee compensation in some form, no particular sort of
institution would be best suited for its adjudication.
Second, features from the context can sometimes provide a
sufficient reason for abrogating a given type of right. A good
example of this phenomenon occurs in the case of what is
commonly called "moral luck."194 Take the example of a father
who has promised both of his children that he will pick them up
promptly after school, encounters problems on the freeway and
is only able to pick up one on time. Both children have (moral)
rights with respect to their father, which derive from the
promises he has made to them. Nevertheless, the circumstances
have prevented the father from picking up the second child, and
most would agree that these particular circumstances give him a
legitimate excuse, which depends on the logic of moral conflict
rather than on the child's interests being somehow
"outweighed." Thus, the child will, if reasonable, excuse the
father's broken promise. If, on the other hand, the father had
decided that he could increase overall happiness by forgetting to
pick both children up and by going, instead, on a vacation to
another country, both children would have legitimate
(unexcused) moral claims against their father. In the first case,
features about the context in which the claim arises are
sufficient to warrant an excuse. In the latter, they are not.
Presently, the Court's functionalist test for Article III
legitimacy allows deontological rights to be submitted to Article
I forums in narrow bands whenever Congress thinks there is a
strong enough reason for such a delegation. Although this
threatens their status as deontological rights, which should
trump majoritarian reasoning, it is the only way to delegate
sufficient jurisdiction for efficient bankruptcy and agency
resolutions, given the sourcing premise. The next section thus
reinterprets the Court's present functionalist test in light of the
context-based view of rights just elucidated, and shows that

194. For excellent discussions of this phenomenon in our moral lives, see Thomas
Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 24 (Thomas Nagel ed., 1979); Bernard
Williams, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK 20 (Bernard Williams ed., 1981).
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these problems can be resolved without threatening the values
that are fundamental to Article III.
III. APPLICATION OF THE NEW APPROACH
Under the present four-factor test elaborated in Schor,
courts testing the constitutionality of a given exercise of judicial
power by a non-Article III court should look at the following four
factors:
1.
2.
3.
4.

the origins and importance of the right to be
adjudicated;
the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the
requirements of Article III.
the extent to which the 'essential attributes of judicial
power' are reserved to Article III courts; and
the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises
the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested
only in Article III courts. 195

Because the first factor emphasizes the origin of a right, the
sourcing premise is clearly presumed in this factor.
What is less evident, but equally true, is that the sourcing
premise shapes the way the rest of these values are elaborated.
This is because, under the Schor test, the source of a right
generates an initial determination as to whether it should be
adjudicated by an Article I or Article III court. In order to
maintain the strength and coherence of the modern
administrative state, however, Article I courts must have some
jurisdiction over paradigmatically Article III claims. The Schor
test resolves this problem by reference to the other three factors,
which introduce its central notion of weighing. In particular,
the test allows rights that would otherwise require Article III
treatment to be delegated to Article I tribunals so long as two
requirements are met: Congress's reasons for delegating the
right must outweigh the values underlying the right (see factor
2), and the extent to which any Article III values are disturbed
must be "minimal" and must not upset our overall system of
checks and balances (see factors 3 and 4). This notion of
weighing majoritarian concerns against the value of certain
rights in order to warrant narrow delegations of jurisdiction is
thus produced in part by reliance on the sourcing premise.
Schor's resolution implies that counter-majoritarian rights can
195.

See Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 (emphases added).
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always be outweighed by majoritarian interests and so strips
these rights of their very status and coherence.
From a context-based perspective, the values underlying
Article III can be articulated in another more helpful manner,
which does not allow this kind of weighing to play such a central
role. Instead of the four factors above, courts might look at:
1.

2.

3.

4.

Impartiality, in the sense of having a right adjudicated
by an institution that is disposed to interpret it
correctly, regardless of the consequences of the
determination to particular individuals or classes of
individuals;
Separation of powers, which is generally given a
competence rationale and is reflected in the Court's
present test for the "essential attributes of judicial
power";
Checks and balances meant to stop-gap the threat of
tyranny by keeping each of the three federal branches
of government from achieving undue power over the
others; and
Narrowness of delegations, which will be important, on
this version of the test, only when an Article I court can
impartially interpret a right.

The first factor in this test, impartiality, mirrors the
concerns in the first two factors of the Schor test. There are,
however, some important differences. First, from a contextbased view, the question of whether a tribunal can impartially
adjudicate a certain type of right (i.e., factor 1) will be assessed
not just on the basis of where the right originates and how
important it is but also in terms of the value that impartiality
demands in the context where the claim is asserted. The
meaning of this proposition will become clearer as the test is
applied to various concrete cases below. Second, the reasons for
departing from the presumed location of adjudication will
sometimes be assessed not in terms of their weight but in terms
of whether a distinct approach to impartiality is warranted in
the particular circumstances. Factors two and three, in turn,
elaborate on the concerns outlined in factors three and four of
the original test, but divest them of the idea that they need to be
weighed. The notion of weighing, finally, is relegated to the
fourth factor. Importantly, the context-based test will allow for
"weighing" and for "narrow" delegations of judicial power to
Article I courts only when there are no contravening
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/4
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impartiality concerns at play.
By applying this new "context-based" test to several areas of
the law, the remainder of this section demonstrates how a
renewed approach to Article III can not only increase
bankruptcy law's viability from the perspective of social policy
but offer a unified approach to Article III that preserves the
independence of the federal judiciary.
A. Application to Bankruptcy
A context-based approach to Article III can, as an initial
matter, help resolve some of the problems with bankruptcy court
jurisdiction that have been discussed in this article. This section
examines how application of each of the four factors set forth
under a context-based theory of Article III would affect the scope
of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.
With regard to the first value-the functionalist concern for
impartiality, or fairness to the individual-the present
bankruptcy code reflects the sourcing premise in its distinction
between "core" and "non-core" claims. 196 As stated before, it
attempts to maintain impartiality by requiring consent for the
1 97
non-Article III adjudication of any claims that are "non-core,"'
but thereby creates incentives for delay and forum-shopping and
sometimes makes bankruptcy an improper vehicle to handle
creditor-debtor relations at or near circumstances of insolvency.
The present system also has the untoward effect of delegating
small portions of what the Court holds to be judicial power to
non-Article III tribunals.
Although some rights adjudicated in the bankruptcy context
may be strongly counter-majoritarian when viewed from the
perspective of their source alone, a context-based approach to
impartiality will yield helpful insights as to how they might
otherwise be viewed.
This approach begins by noting a
fundamental intuition concerning particularities of the
bankruptcy context. In ordinary circumstances, where resources
are relatively plentiful, a correct or impartial determination of a
given claim to those resources is important because the parties
can thereafter invoke the mechanism of the state to enforce the
entitlement. The goal of impartiality is thus essentially tied to
the goal of compensation, and the fairness of the compensation
will in turn depend on one's ability to obtain the amount owed.
196.
197.

See 28 U.S.C. § 157.
As noted, however, this two-tier schema is something of a fiction in practice.
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In these ordinary circumstances, rights deriving from the
Constitution or state law may thus warrant adjudication by an
institution with few majoritarian ties because the rights
themselves are more likely to be interpreted correctly by a
tribunal that has some measure of independence from
majoritarian influences.
If, however, the goal of impartiality is closely tied to the goal
of compensation, the notion of impartiality should not be
construed to produce requirements that would undermine a
party's chances of obtaining this compensation. This creates a
problem in the bankruptcy context because, here, legal rights
are under the threat of extinction. Each creditor thus bears the
risk of receiving nothing back on her claim, and this risk is only
increased in the absence of an efficient bankruptcy mechanism.
Because correct determinations may turn out to be
unenforceable in this context, correctness takes on a very
different value in relation to efficiency.
It follows that the desire for impartiality may take on a very
different shape inside and outside of the bankruptcy context.
Arguably, if the state were to adjudicate a right in the former
context, and then parcel out resources on the basis of this
determination, a lack of impartiality could be construed as an
unconstitutional taking once the state mechanisms were put
into play to enforce the determination. In the latter case,
however, there can be no taking by the government. There is
only misfortune and the question of who should bear its risk.
Moreover, bankruptcy law mitigates the threat of loss to all
involved, and thus helps to preserve the expected value of all
legal rights involved. A bankruptcy system is in fact justified
only insofar as it can help mitigate these losses. Because
bankruptcy law can mitigate these losses only on the condition
that it functions efficiently, bankruptcy is one of the few
contexts where efficiency helps meet the Article III concern for
fairness to the individual.
With respect to contract creditors, consent to non-Article III
jurisdiction can also be viewed as arising out of the creditordebtor relation itself. As stated before, the context-based theory
views rights as presumptions that can generally be rebutted by
the consent of the relevant right-holder. 198 This consent need
not, however, occur at the time of the bankruptcy proceedings
themselves.
One might, for example, argue that Article I
198.

See supra Section II.C.
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jurisdiction over claims arising at or near insolvency should be
granted by default, and then allow parties to contract around
this default rule if they make their intentions explicit in the
original loan. Under such a rule, creditors would automatically
bear the risk of the enterprise's failure, and failure to contract
around the rule would be interpreted as a form of consent. Once
the rule was known, however, creditors would presumably pass
the costs of these risks off to debtors in the form of increased
premiums, and in practice most creditors would also diversify
their risks so as to shoulder them better than any independent
debtor.
Although this view depends on the parties' freedom to
contract and requires a distinct volitional act, a stronger view
that applies outside of contract can be constructed on its basis.
In particular, one might argue that consent to Article I
jurisdiction should be gleaned from the circumstances of
insolvency as an immutable rather than as a default rule. As
such, the rule would be viewed as one that cannot be contracted
around by the parties at all, and so need not be limited to claims
that rest on the parties' ability to contract.
There are several possible rationales for this stronger view.
One might argue that it is justified by the fact that the state has
the power to set this term as a condition of its enforcement of
contractual relations in general. Alternatively, one might argue
for this view on the ground that any other rule would allow for
the threat of unconscionable conduct on the part of some
creditors at the point of insolvency. Perhaps the strongest
reason for adopting this view derives from political theory,
however. Political theory often distinguishes between "actual"
and "hypothetical" consent in order to clarify that consent need
not always be actual to rebut the presumption of a rightholder. 199 Whereas the notion of actual consent requires a
voluntary act on the part of the individual, hypothetical consent
models require only that a reasonable person under certain
idealized epistemological circumstances--e.g., a person choosing
from behind a "veil of ignorance," which severely limits one's
knowledge of one's particular circumstances-would have

199. See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, Justifiably Punishingthe Justified, 90 MICH. L. REv.
2203, 2305 (1992) (distinguishing between actual and hypothetical consent); David
Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89
MICH. L. REv. 1815, 1823 (1991); Daniel P. Brudney, Hypothetical Consent and Moral
Force, 10 LAw & PHiL. 235 (1991).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1999

47

MontanaMONTANA
Law Review, Vol.
60 [1999],
Iss. 2, Art. 4
LAW
REVIEW

Vol. 60

consented to rebut the presumption reflected in a right.200
This notion of hypothetical consent is important because
creditors seeking to split claims in a bankruptcy proceeding are
generally seeking unfair advantages that they can only obtain
because of the particularities of their situation in relation to the
debtor and other creditors. Behind a veil of ignorance, these
creditors would, however, not be able to know whether they
would be one of the few who could take this unfair advantage.
These creditors would thus opt for rules that prevent these sorts
of activities, and Article I jurisdiction might be justified on the
ground that an ideal creditor behind a veil of ignorance would
consent to the jurisdiction in disputes involving a party in
bankruptcy. Even without a "core/non-core" distinction, 20 ' and
even without individual consent to bankruptcy court jurisdiction
at the time of the actual proceedings, 20 2 bankruptcy law can thus
be viewed as meeting Article III's concern for individual fairness
from a context-based view.
For similar reasons, a delegation of jurisdiction to
bankruptcy courts over state and constitutional claims arising at
or near insolvency can be viewed as consistent with Article III's
concern for separation of powers. Before proceeding, it is
important to distinguish between "separation of powers" and
"checks and balances." Under the Court's present functionalist
approach, these concepts are sometimes conflated because a
system is often deemed to separate powers properly whenever
the three federal branches of government can check the others'
excesses. This conception of separation of powers is, however,
incorrect as a description of our constitutional practice. Our
Constitution appears to give specific powers to the different
branches, 20 3 which suggests that it would not tolerate just any
division of power that evades the threat of tyranny. Rather than
conflating these two values, it is thus better to require that the
"judicial power" reflected in the term "separation of powers"
extend, at minimum, to the paradigmatic judicial acts of
interpreting and applying the law. Then the separation of
powers concept would suggest that any acts of interpreting and
applying federal law should be presumed, in the first instance,
to lie within the province of an Article III tribunal.
200. This notion of hypothetical consent is framed in John Rawls's work.
generally RAWIS, supra note 16.
201. See 28 U.S.C. § 157.
202. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).
203. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III.
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This presumption can, however, be rebutted whenever the
context in which the legal claim arises possesses features that
either would make an exercise of judicial power irrelevant or
unwarranted or would undermine the very conditions of judicial
power.
For the same reasons discussed in examining
impartiality from a context-based perspective, actual or
hypothetical consent to Article I jurisdiction when interpreting
legal principles involving a bankrupt party can thus be gleaned
from the bankruptcy context, where rights are already under the
threat of extinction. This context provides a rationale for pitting
utility over more strictly deontological values that even a
deontological theorist might accept, and an expanded
bankruptcy court jurisdiction is consistent with Article III's
separation of powers concerns.
The system of bankruptcy can also be seen to meet Article
III's concern for checks and balances under a context-based
approach to Article III. As Justice White has pointed out, the
cases that come into bankruptcy courts are rarely very
politicized, at least with respect to divisions between the three
federal branches of government. 2°4 In fact, no one has seriously
entertained the idea that bankruptcy jurisdiction alone
constitutes an encroachment that is likely to lead to tyranny in
the United States. Rather, the predominant fear is that this
encroachment is part of a larger movement, which will take
large amounts of power away from the judiciary by divesting it
of jurisdiction in small stages. Once the separation of powers
criterion is understood from a context-based perspective,
however, an expanded bankruptcy court jurisdiction can no
longer be viewed as a delegation of power that threatens this
larger slide.
This is because it is particularities of the
bankruptcy context, rather than weighty majoritarian impulses,
that require Article I tribunals to adjudicate many of the
different sorts of claims that arise in bankruptcy proceedings.
These particularities are, however, specific to bankruptcy and
will not warrant similar moves in other legal contexts. Perhaps
more importantly, the reasons for this exception do not entail a
similar exception whenever utilitarian concerns would demand
one, and so do not threaten the status of any deontological rights
in question. The weighing factor, which was so central to the
Schor test, does not play any role in the present analysis.
This last move should make the final feature of the Schor
204.

NorthernPipeline, 458 U.S. at 115 (White, J., dissenting).
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test-the narrowness requirement-irrelevant as well.
As
stated above, the narrowness requirement should raise
suspicion not only because it is vague, but because it raises the
specter of a piecemeal erosion of the judicial power of the United
States as Congress creates a series of highly specialized Article I
tribunals that take away the judiciary's tasks one at a time. If
bankruptcy is viewed from a context-based perspective, however,
increased jurisdiction is consistent with the maintenance of
complete judicial power in Article III forums. The context-based
view is thus special because it allows space for increased
bankruptcy court jurisdiction to be carved out in a principled
manner without threatening the independence of the federal
judiciary.
B. Application to Military Courts, TerritorialCourts, and Courts
Deciding Public Rights
As shown in Section III.A, the context-based approach to
Article III can be used to allow for a wider range of bankruptcy
court jurisdiction than is possible under the present bankruptcy
code and under present constitutional law. This section explores
the question of whether this new approach can also provide a
unifying explanation of the traditional exceptions to Article III
in the cases of military courts, territorial courts and courts
deciding public rights. In the process, it attempts to shed light
on the proper limits of the modern administrative state.
1. Military Courts
That the sourcing premise has loomed large in the history
and development of the Article III exception for military courts
is clear from the history of the subject. Military courts, or
"courts-martial," as they are sometimes called, are Article I
courts that have existed since the founding of this country and
have handled a large range of military adjudications. 205
Presently, military judges enjoy fifteen year terms and have no
guarantees against salary diminution. 20 6 Although these courts
lack Article III protections, their constitutionality was upheld as
early as 1858 in Dynes v. Hoover,20 7 at a time when courts205. See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 49 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
("Court-martial proceedings, as a primary means for the regulation and discipline of the
Armed Forces, were well known to the Founding Fathers.").
206. U.C.M.J arts. 67, 142; 10 U.S.C. §§ 867, 942 (Supp. IV 1992).
207. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
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martial had the statutory power to address only issues
concerning the punishment of "military crimes," which included
crimes such as desertion and mutiny. 208 Since then:
Congress has steadily expanded the subject-matter jurisdiction of
military courts: first, in 1863 to all common law felonies
committed by military personnel in wartime, then, in 1916 to all
felonies except murder and rape committed [by servicepersons]
during peacetime in the continental United States, and, finally in
1951 to all felonies
committed [by military personnel] in wartime
20 9
or peacetime.

This expansion of military court jurisdiction to rights that
originate in sources other than the military code caused the
Court great concern shortly after this last expansion. In 1969,
the Court adjudicated the constitutionality of this expansion in
O'Callahan v. Parker.210
Noting that military courts are
"singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of
constitutional law,"211 the Court formulated what is now known
as the "service-connection test" for legitimate military court
jurisdiction. 212 Under this test, military courts could be denied
Article III status so long as their jurisdiction was limited to
offenses "relating to the military. 2 13 Although the scope of the
phrase "relating to the military" was unclear, the test in practice
excluded most violations of laws other than those finding their
source in the military code. The test thus reflected the sourcing
premise in a rather strong form.
As soon as O'Callahan was issued, the service-connection
test came under sharp criticism from both judges and scholars,
who viewed it as placing undue limits on a type of jurisdiction
that had traditionally been excepted from Article III
requirements altogether. 214 In 1987, the Court responded to
208. See An Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the United States, ch. 33,
2 Stat. 45 (1800); An Act for Establishing Rules and Articles for the Government of the
Armies of the United States, ch. 20, 2 Stat. 359 (1806).
209. Note, Military Justice and Article III, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1909, 1915 (1990)
[hereinafter Military Justice].
210. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
211. Id. at 265.
212. See generally, Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, Courts-MartialJurisdictionOver
Members of Armed Forces for "Civilian"Offenses, 14 A.L.R. FED. 152 (1973).
213. See id. at 163.
214. O'Callahanwas first criticized in dissent by Justice Harlan and then provoked
a series of scholarly criticisms. See John F. O'Connor, Don't Know Much About History:
The Constitution, Historical Practice, and the Death Penalty Jurisdiction of CourtsMartial, 52 U. MIAM L. REV. 177, 245 (1997) (citing Robinson 0. Everett, O'Callahan v.
Parker, Milestone or Millstone in Military Justice?, 1969 DuKE L.J. 853 (1969); Grant S.
Nelson & James E. Westbrook, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Servicemen for
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these criticisms by reverting to a test that allows military courts
jurisdiction on the basis not of the origin or type of crime
committed but of the status of the accused-and, in particular, on
the basis of whether the accused was part of the military when
the crime was committed. 215 Many have argued that this sort of
delegation violates the Court's present test for Article III
validity, 216 however, because it allows military courts to
adjudicate a host of rights that derive from outside the military
code. Although the proper limits of military court jurisdiction
are far from clear, the history of this jurisprudence shows that
the Court has been concerned about allowing constitutional
rights and other deontological rights to be adjudicated by
military courts but has ultimately been unwilling to let the
source of the right be the final arbiter of jurisdiction. The Court
has not, however, had a principled alternative at its disposal.
A context-based theory can provide this alternative and can
thereby yield a better perspective on the proper limits of
military court jurisdiction, both as a descriptive and as a
normative matter. The theory explains, for example, why the
status of a service-person might influence the determination
with respect to the Article III value of impartiality. The military
is an organization that is built to protect the foundations and
2 17
coherence of our ongoing status as an independent country,
and this implies the protection of a common goal and potential
218
sacrifice of individual interests to that goal.
Service-members are, in turn, either volunteers or
draftees. 219 If they are volunteers, their entry into the service
can be viewed as an act of consent, which places the service"Civilian"Offenses: An Analysis of O'Callahan v. Parker, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1969);
Ronald L. Wilkinson, The Narrowing Scope of Court-MartialJurisdiction:O'Callahan v.
Parker, 9 WASHBURN L.J. 193 (1969); Peter W. Bowie, Comment, O'Callahan v. Parker:
Sounding the Death Knell of Military Justice?, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 55 (1970); John F.
DePue, Comment, O'Callahan and its Progeny: A Survey of Their Impact on the
Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial, 15 VILL. L. REV. 712 (1970); Don A. Wetzel, Comment,
O'Callahan v. Parker, A Military JurisdictionalDilemma, 22 BAYLOR L. REV. 64 (1970);
David F.P. O'Connor & Teresa M. Schwartz, Recent Decisions: Military Law, 38 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 170 (1969-1970)).
215. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
216. See, e.g., Military Justice, supra note 210, at 1918.
217. See, e.g., Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare
Assertions of 'Public Morality" Qualify as Legitimate Government Interests for the
Purposes of Equal ProtectionReview?, 87 GEO. L.J. 139, 193 (1998).
218. See S. REP. No. 103-12, at 272 (1993) (discussing the need for members of
military teams to make sacrifices for the good of the whole).
219. See Thomas W. Ross, Raising an Army: A Positive Theory of Military
Recruitment, 37 J.L. & ECON. 109, 109 (1994).
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members' individual goals into service of the whole. If, on the
other hand, service-members are draftees, then drastic
circumstances have come into play, circumstances that may
affect the ongoing coherence of the state. Without a state, there
would be no apparatus to protect deontological rights in the first
place, and in these circumstances, consent to service can thus be
inferred from those features that constitute hypothetical consent
in general. Although deontological rights normally serve as
trumps on utilitarian reasoning, consent to Article I
adjudication of these claims can sometimes be gleaned from the
military context.
With regard to separation of powers and checks and
balances, military court jurisdiction also seems to be relatively
unproblematic. In the processes of ordinary government, the
basic separation of powers goals are met when there is a parity
among the three branches, such that the legislative branch
makes the law, the executive branch enforces the law, and the
judicial branch interprets the law. 220 The command of an army
by the President, however, which is a power expressly granted to
the Executive Branch by the Constitution, 22 1 takes place
predominantly by executive order rather than by law, 222 and so
military regulation represents a sphere to which these
traditional concepts of parity do not apply. As long as the army
is limited to that branch of our armed forces that is manned for
the protection of the country, 223 its regulation by an Article I
tribunal will thus not infringe upon the constitutionally required
tripartite division of federal government in the case of ordinary
governing and law-making.
A context-based rationale for military court jurisdiction
would, finally, also place some important limits on that
jurisdiction. Ordinarily, consent can only be used to waive
rights that are alienable. To the extent that military court

220. See generally Samuel C. Kaplan, "Grab Bag of Principles"or Principled Grab
Bag?: The Constitutionalizationof Common Law, 49 S.C. L. REV. 463, 463-64 (1998).
221. See U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 1.
222. At various times, the Department of the Army has adopted explicit procedures
for implementing these executive orders. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. §§ 651.34-.40 (1990)
(implementing Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 734 (1961-1981), reprintedin 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321 app. at 515 (1982)).
223. Moreover, the conditions under which an army can be created are limited to
volunteering and drafting: only consent or necessity can validate military jurisdiction
over a person. Because neither condition obtains in the ordinary state of government,
neither will unduly affect the checks and balances necessary to maintain a proper
separation of powers in ordinary government.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1999

53

MontanaMONTANA
Law Review, Vol.
60 [1999],
Iss. 2, Art. 4
LAW
REVIEW

Vol. 60

jurisdiction rests on actual consent, it should thus never be
viewed as extending to fundamental rights like the rights to
equal protection or to be free from deprivations of life, liberty or
property without due process of law in peace time. Similarly,
even consent derived from circumstances requiring more dire
military action is most plausibly viewed as consent to
jurisdiction regarding crimes committed while in the role of a
service-person or adjudicated during the crisis. 224 In cases of
extreme necessity, where Article III values cannot be
maintained without putting the nation's concern as an ongoing
entity at stake, even inalienable rights might be adjudicated
legitimately in military tribunals on the theory that the power
that protects those very rights is at stake. In practice, these
sorts of cases should be extremely rare. Thus, a context-based
perspective can illustrate why there has traditionally been an
Article III exception for military courts while simultaneously
helping clarify how to draw proper limits on that exception.
2. TerritorialCourts
This article will not attempt to provide a systematic review
of all the many possible forms of territorial courts, sometimes
referred to as "Article IV courts,"225 that have existed. Some
common features run through almost all of them, however, and
these features will be important for the purposes of this article.
Almost all territorial courts are, for example, created pursuant
to an act of Congress, 226 almost all have subject-matter
jurisdiction that is at least as broad as that of Article III
courts 227 and almost none are granted the tenure and protection
against salary diminution prescribed by Article 111.228 As one
commentator has noted:
the constitutional and legal status of the United States Territories
and affiliated states is a matter of major importance to this entire
224. Although one might consent to further jurisdiction, there seems to be no good
reason to presume such consent. It might even be unconscionable for the Army to ask for
it in some drafting circumstances, given persons initial bargaining positions.
225. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 913 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) (stating that territorial courts "are neither Article
III courts nor Article I courts, but Article IV courts").
226. See Stanley K Laughlin, Jr., The ConstitutionalStructure of the Courts of the
United States Territories:The Case of American Samoa, 13 U. RAW. L. REV. 379, 383-84
(1991).
227. See Burkeley N. Riggs & Tamera D. Westerberg, Judicial Independence: An
HistoricalPerspective, 74 DENY. U.L. REV. 337, 349 (1997).

228.

See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400 (1973).
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country and its legal community. For one thing, nearly four
million people, most of them United States citizens, nationals or
persons under the protection of the United States, live in those
229
areas and their ranks are increasing rather than diminishing.

Still, the Court has always excepted territorial courts from
Article III in some manner, and a context-based approach can
explain and refine this exception.
With regard to impartiality, there are two main features of
the territorial context that may excuse Article III guarantees for
the adjudication of certain paradigmatically non-majoritarian
rights.
First, because no independent state government
precedes and subsists through the act of Congress that creates
the territory, no state court system is in place in the
territories.20 In the United States, however, Article III courts
are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction and only state
courts have general jurisdiction. 23 1 Ordinarily, territorial courts
must therefore play a hybrid state-federal role if they are to
fulfill all the roles needed by a judiciary.
This dual role is, in fact, indicative of a deeper distinction
between territorial courts and federal courts within the United
States: territorial courts are often created by treaty, and aid in
the government of countries that have not consented to, and are
not fully incorporated into, American government. 232 Therefore,
constraints on the legitimate form of courts and government
instituted often derive from agreements between the preceding
local government and the United States and from settlements
relating to foreign policy, rather than from fundamental
structural concerns concerning the United States' internal selfgovernment.
Even when United States law applies in a
territory, the degree to which a territory respects rights as
having a deontological status will thus depend on features of
that territory and on its autonomous conception of government.
In creating a treaty with the United States, it would be possible
for the individuals, through their preceding local government, to
229. Laughlin, supra note 227, at 388-89.
230. See 72 AM. JUR. 2D States, Territories, and Dependencies § 159 (1974) ("The
powers... exercised by the territorial legislatures are nearly as extensive as those
exercised by any state legislature, and the jurisdiction of the territorial courts is
collectively coextensive with and correspondent to that of the state courts.").
231. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 2.12.4 (3d ed. 1985).
232. This is the case, for example, with the territorial courts of American Samoa,
Guam, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. See Marian Nash
(Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 92
AM. J. INT'L L. 243, 250 (1998).
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consent to an alienation of the deontological status of all but
their inalienable rights.
Separation of powers and checks and balances concerns also
seem to drop out in the territorial context. Because territories
are not fully integrated into the United States, they are best
viewed as foreign entities that have enlisted American aid in an

unusually dependent manner for a terminable period of time. 233

In this sort of context, the domestic notion of separation of
powers will have no application, and foreign conceptions of how
to divide power may come to the forefront. In fact, insofar as
power is allocated to any domestic branch of government in
territorial matters, it is given to Congress by the Constitution. 234
Thus, assuming that the United States government maintains
the proper checks and balances domestically, there should be no
threat of this sort of congressional power upsetting this
appropriate checks and balances.
These remarks suggest that Article III's values can coexist
with Article I territorial courts so long as Article I jurisdiction
over legal matters is limited to the territories, so long as
inalienable rights are guaranteed, and so long as these Article I
courts are prevented from adjudicating claims that are
predominantly domestic in nature.
In fact, the present
jurisprudence concerning territorial courts mirrors just these
requirements. Under the so-called "incorporation doctrine," as
expressed in Downes v. Bidwell,235 constitutional values are fully
applicable to the territories only if those territories have been
suitably "incorporated" into the United States. 236 Fundamental,
or inalienable, rights are nevertheless guaranteed even in
unincorporated territories. 237 This suggests, finally, that a
system of territorial courts would retain the "essential attributes
of judicial power"238 if it allowed Article III review of territorial

233. The case of the North Mariana Islands is a case in point. See Marybeth
Herald, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag into United States Territoriesor Can It Be
Separately Purchasedand Sold, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 707, 756 (1995).
234.

See U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 3, cl.2.

235. 182 U.S. 244(1901).
236. See id. at 285-87.
237. For example, "[p]laces subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, but
which are not incorporated into it, and hence are not within the United States in the
completest sense of those words, are recognized by the provision of the Thirteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, prohibiting slavery within the United
States 'or any place subject to their jurisdiction.'" 72 AM. JUR. 2D States, Territories,and
Dependencies § 138 (1974) (citation omitted).
238. Northern Pipeline,458 U.S. at 81.
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adjudications of fundamental rights but allowed Article I
jurisdiction over any other rights.
3. The "PublicRights" Doctrine
For the purposes of this article, the most important
exception to Article III derives from the public rights doctrine.
This exception, which, in its present form, allows administrative
agencies to adjudicate rights that derive from broad regulatory
schemes, 239 has in fact been expanded greatly in the last two
many to be an important linchpin
decades and is considered by
240
in the administrative state.
From a context-based perspective, the source of a right in a
broad regulatory scheme would be insufficient to warrant
wholesale jurisdiction over it in an Article I forum. Within the
public rights doctrine, three distinct types of public rights can,
however, be distinguished, and each should be analyzed
separately from a context-based perspective. First, there are
a
public rights that involve suits between the government and241
party, and for which sovereign immunity genuinely applies.
In this class of cases, the public rights exception would seem to
apply because the context gives the government the power to
abstain from being sued altogether. Consequently, it should
have the power, deriving from its status, to attach this condition
to its being sued. The only conditions that would be intolerable
would be those that asked individuals to alienate fundamental
rights, and Article III jurisdiction-perhaps in the form of
Article III review-should thus be maintained over these core
rights.
Second, there are public rights that are part of broad
regulatory schemes and require agency expertise for their
interpretation. 242 In such cases, it seems that the essential
properties of judicial power should still be vested in a federal
court because these decisions are in principle nothing more than
interpretations of the law.
Finally, there are rules that are parts of broad regulatory
239. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 857.
240. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Symposium, The Federal Courts and Congress:
Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 261011 (1998).
241. This is the kind of public rights that the plurality in Northern Pipeline
discussed most fully. See 458 U.S. at 67-71.
242. These are the kinds of public rights addressed squarely in Schor. See 478 U.S.
at 845.
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schemes in a more refined sense. These are rights that derive
from rules that do not have the full status as law but are instead
merely procedures implemented by the executive branch to carry
out its internal affairs. 243 In these instances, rights deriving
from these broad regulatory schemes are neither deontological
nor rule utilitarian, but possibly strictly utilitarian, and their
interpretation may be vested solely in an Article I tribunal. A
context-based view of public rights would thus allow for strict
delegations of adjudicatory power to Article I courts only in
limited circumstances but would allow adjudications of a
broader class of rights, in the first instance, if the rights derive
from a broad regulatory scheme.
This perspective would
therefore recommend only minor changes in the Court's present
jurisprudence.
More importantly, however, the context-based view can now
be seen to warrant exceptions to Article III in precisely the same
circumstances as warranted by history. This fact provides a
strong reason for accepting the view as a viable and principled
"unified approach to Article III," which has been so often sought
by the courts.
C. CONCLUSION

As many commentators have noted, the Court's present
Article III jurisprudence is a particularly confused and
unprincipled area of the law. 2 " This article has argued that this
confusion stems in large part from two seemingly conflicting
interests: (1) giving certain courts, like bankruptcy courts and
administrative agencies, increased jurisdiction for the sake of
efficiency 245 while (2) preserving the independence of the federal
judiciary and the counter-majoritarian values it protects. 246
This article has argued that the sense of paradox between these
two goals, as well as many of the unworkable attempts to
resolve it, derives from an unexamined reliance on the sourcing
premise. 247 Although this premise has deep roots in political
243.
Executive orders are a good example of this sort of phenomenon, as are some of
the internal rules and regulations that govern, for example, internal INS procedure.

244. See, e.g., Schor, 478 U.S. at 847 (noting that the Court's "precedents in this
area do not admit of easy synthesis"); Ethan Boyer, Article III, the Foreign Relations
Power, and the BinationalPanel of NAFTA, 13 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw. 101, 115 ("Article
III jurisprudence has been a somewhat confused area of constitutional law.").
245. See supra Section II.A.
246. See supra Section lI.B.
247. See supra Section II.C.
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theory and captures something important about how the texture
of a right can be linked to the processes by which it is enacted,
this premise is only part of the story about how rights function.
More generally, this article has demonstrated how a limited
or one-sided understanding of certain basic concepts, e.g., of
rights, can operate to blind legislators and judges to important
avenues of legal reform. This blindness occurs because key
doctrines are formulated in ways that are shaped by how these
primary concepts are framed. Often, however, these more
primary concepts have not been subjected to extensive reflection,
and a primitive understanding of them can narrow the forms
the doctrines themselves will take. After reflecting on these
concepts and paying closer attention to how some of them
function in our ordinary moral practices and discourse, legal
officials can therefore free up options that are not readily
apparent.
In the present instance, this process has, for example,
helped produce a unified approach to Article III that both
explains and refines the current delegations of judicial power to
non-Article III forums such as bankruptcy courts. It has also
helped indicate that broader or narrower jurisdiction may be
appropriate in certain critical areas. The process has done more
than just this, however. If philosophy is reflection on ordinary
language and on its foundational principles, then this article has
helped show that there is a valid place for philosophy in the
articulation and interpretation of the law. This role should not
be very surprising: philosophy can help clarify the law's
foundations, thus allowing it to develop without the obstruction
of conceptual frameworks that are ultimately extrinsic to its
subject.
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